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Refraining Redress:
A "Social Healing Through Justice"
Approach to United States-Native Hawaiian
and Japan-Ainu Reconciliation Initiatives
Eric K. Yamamotot and Ashley Kaiao Obreytt
One billion dollars and an apology. reparations by the United States
government for 60,000 surviving Americans of Japanese ancestry
imprisoned during World War H without charges, trial or evidence of
necessity. Redress for lost homes, families, and freedom, for serious harm
inflicted by a government on its own people on account of their race.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2008 marks the twentieth anniversary of Japanese American
2internment redress under the Civil Liberties Act of 1988. Its impact has
been far-reaching.3
On an individual level, redress was cathartic for many Japanese
Americans-a measure of dignity restored. Long-stigmatized with the taint
of racial disloyalty, former Japanese American internees could finally talk
about their trauma. One woman in her sixties recounted that she "always
felt the internment was wrong, but that after being told by the military, the
President and the Supreme Court that it was a necessity," she seriously
doubted herself. But now "[r]edress and reparations, and the recent
successful court challenges, have freed [my] soul."
4
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I. Eric K. Yamamoto, Friend, Foe or Something Else: Social Meanings of Redress and
Reparations, 20 DENY. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 223 (1992) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Social Meanings of
Redress].
2. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1989 (1988) (authorizing presidential apology,
$20,000 in individual payments and public education fund).
3. See generally Susan Kiyomi Serrano and Dale Minami, Korematsu v. United States: A
"Constant Caution " in a Time of Crisis, 10 ASIAN L.J. 37 (2003).
4. Yamamoto, Social Meanings of Redress, supra note 1, at 227.
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On a societal level, Japanese American redress provided insights into
the breakdown of democratic checks and balances during national distress.5
It revealed the extraordinary social cost of near-total judicial deference to
executive curtailment of American civil liberties under the false mantle of
national security.6  As a central aspect of Asian American legal theory, 7 it
also opened the eyes of governments and victims of injustice to the social
value of government redress. Many present-day reparations or
reconciliation movements in established democracies, including the United
States, cite symbolic payment to Japanese Americans as a catalyst or
guide.8
5. See MITCHELL MAKI, HARRY KITANO AND MEGAN BERTHOLD, ACHIEVING THE IMPOSSIBLE
DREAM: How JAPANESE AMERICANS ACHIEVED REDRESS (2004) (describing the political and legal
process of Japanese American redress).
6. See Serrano & Minami, Korematsu v. United States: A "Constant Caution, " supra note 3;
Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited-Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary Government
Excess and Lax Judicial Review, Time for a Better Accommodation of National Security Concerns and
Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited].
7. Asian American legal theory emerged in the 1990s as a scholarly field initially informed in
part by inquiries into the legal and social impacts of 1988 Japanese American Redress and increasing
Asian immigrant populations. See generally Robert Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal
Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241
(1993) (describing an emerging Asian American legal theory); Robert Chang and Neil Gotanda,
Afterward.- The Race Question in LatCrit Theory and Asian American Jurisprudence, 7 NEV. L.J. 1012
(2007). For Asian American legal scholarship on redress, see Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Jerry Kang, Denying
Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 933-1013 (2004) [hereinafter Kang,
Denying Prejudice]; Natsu Taylor Saito, At the Heart of Law: Remedies for Massive Wrongs, 27 REV.
LITIG. 281 (2008) [hereinafter Saito, Remedies for Massive Wrongs]; Natsu Taylor Saito, Justice Held
Hostage: US. Disregard for International Law in the World War 11 Internment of Japanese
Peruvians-A Case Study, 40 B.C. L. REV 275 (1998) [hereinafter Saito, Justice Held Hostage];
Lorraine K. Bannai, Taking the Stand: The Lessons of Three Men who Took the Japanese Internment to
Court, 4 SEATTLE J.S.J. I (2005); Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of the Internment:
Earl Warren, Brown and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73 (1998); Chris lijima,
Reparations and the "Model Minority" Ideology of Acquiescence: The Necessity to Refuse the Return
to Original Humiliation, 40 B.C. L. REV. 385 (1998); Eric Muller, Apologies or Apologists?
Remembering the Japanese American Internment in Wyoming, I WYO. L. REV. 473 (2001); Christine
Hung, For Those Who Had No Voice: The Multifaceted Fight for Redress for the "Comfort Women, "
15 ASIAN AM. L.J. 177 (2008); ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, MARGARET CHON, CAROL IZUMI, JERRY KANG
AND FRANK WU, RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT
(2001) [hereinafter YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG & Wu, RIGHTS AND REPARATION]; Eric K.
Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims,40 B.C. L.
REV. 477 (1998) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Racial Reparations]; Eric K. Yamamoto, Beyond Redress:
Japanese Americans' Unfinished Business, 7ASIAN L.J. 131 (2000) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Beyond
Redress]; Yamamoto, Social Meanings of Redress, supra note 1; Eric K. Yamamoto, Susan Kiyomi
Serrano and Michelle Natividad Rodriguez, American Racial Justice on Trial-Again: African
American Reparations, Human Rights and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1269 (2003)
[hereinafter Yamamoto, Serrano, & Rodriguez, African American Reparations]; Eric K. Yamamoto,
Reluctant Redress: The U.S. Kidnapping and Internment of Japanese Latin Americans, in BREAKING
THE CYCLES OF HATRED (Martha Minow ed., 2001).
8. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, I J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 47 (1997) (identifying
Japanese American Redress as a catalyst for recent reparations claims in the United States and in other
established democracies) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Race Apologies]; see also infra note 75 (describing
linkage of internment redress to other recent redress movements). There were important earlier redress
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Indeed, redressing the deep wounds of injustice to foster healthy group
relations has become an issue central to the future of civil society,9 both for
long-standing democracies committed to human rights and for countries
transitioning from repressive regimes to democratic governance.'0 Whether
a country heals persisting wounds is increasingly viewed as integral (1)
domestically, to enable its communities to deal with pain, guilt and division
linked to its past in order to live peaceably and work productively in the
future," and (2) globally, to claim legitimacy in the eyes of the world as a
democracy truly committed to civil and human rights (which affects a
country's standing to participate in matters of international security and
responsible economic development). 12  Individuals, communities, and
governments all have a stake in social healing.
Yet confusion permeates widely varying efforts to "heal" social
wounds.' 3  "Reparations," initially connoting healing but now denoting
money payments, may have become too controversially loaded in the
United States to do the needed heavy reparatory work.' 4  And the broad
movements that had become largely inactive until revived in the early 1990s. See ALFRED BROPHY,
REPARATIONS PRO & CON (2005) [hereinafter, BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO & CON]; CHARLES
HENRY, LONG OVERDUE: THE POLITICS OF RACIAL REPARATIONS 98 (2007) (the Civil Liberties Act of
1988 served as a "catalyst for renewed interest in African American reparations"). For instance,
African Americans had long sought reparations for slavery and segregation, starting during the post-
Civil War Reconstruction (forty acres and a mule) and continuing with litigation in the early 1900s
through James Forman's famous "reparations manifesto" in 1970. Id. That dormant reparations
movement gained new life in 1989 with Congressman John Conyers' introduction of a Slavery Study
Commission bill patterned after the Japanese American Internment Study Commission. See id., app. 3,
at 191. Soon after World War II, Germany made substantial reparations to Jewish survivors of the
Holocaust. See generally Morris Ratner & Caryn Becker, The Legacy of Holocaust Class Action Suits:
Have They Broken Ground for Other Cases of Historical Wrongs?, in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY 345, 346 (Michael J. Bazyler & Roger
P. Alford eds., 2006). In the 1990s, new Holocaust-related reparations claims emerged for stolen art,
bank accounts, and lost wages. See id
9. See WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS
FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE I (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999); REDRESS FOR HISTORICAL INJUSTICES IN THE
UNITED STATES (Michael T. Martin and Marilyn Yaquinto eds., 2007).
10. See generally THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS (Pablo de Greif ed., 2007) (describing
eleven successful reparations initiatives, including Japanese American redress, and exploring the
significance of reparations for human rights violations for both established democracies and countries
transitioning to democracy). For countries transitioning from repressive regimes to democracies,
reparations can be integral to nation-building. Reparations that address past horrific political violence
aim to repair psychological and economic damage in order to establish the legitimacy of the new regime
as a democracy embracing human rights, Id.
11. See JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS
EXPERIENCE vii (1994) (recounting studies that show that deeply-embedded discrimination creates
economic and psychological damage that spans generations).
12. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Sandra Hye Yun Kim and Abigail M. Holden, American Reparations
Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 64-74 (2007) (assessing the significance
of reparatory justice to a country's claim to be a democracy committed to human rights) [hereinafter
Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, American Reparations Theory and Practice].
13. See infra Sections III.B and IlI.C.
14. See infra Section III.
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idea of "reconciliation," reflected in political initiatives, 5 is amorphous and
often leaves policymakers and advocates working in the dark, without
guidance or accountability. 6 Indeed, the discourse on Japanese American
redress now tends to focus on money payment to individuals, 7 without
close attention to the psychological import of apologies, story-telling, and
symbolic gestures, or to the societal impact of public education campaigns
about government accountability and reparatory action.' 8
This Article refines a developing Social Healing Through Justice
framework for both guiding and critiquing ongoing redress efforts 9 in
established democracies committed to civil and human rights.2° It does this
at a conceptual level by coalescing multidisciplinary insights into social
healing. It also draws upon American and global redress initiatives and
integrates into the framework evolving human rights principles to deepen
the dimensions of reparatory justice for systemic harms-the
psychological, economic, cultural, and institutional. At a strategic level, it
explores how Social Healing Through Justice at times shapes a country's
redress efforts- in light of concerns about its democratic legitimacy.
In Section IV, the Article employs the "4 R's" of Social Healing
Through Justice-recognition, responsibility, reconstruction, and
reparation-to assess the United States' stalled sixteen-year commitment to
reconcile with Native Hawaiians. Similar to the United States' recent
responses to Native American justice claims,2' that assessment shows initial
15. See infra Section III.C.
16. See infra Section II1.C.
17. See, e.g., BROPHY, REPARATION PRO AND CON, supra note 8, at 3 (describing the "Civil
Liberties Act, which provides compensation to Japanese Americans interned during World War I1").
18. See infra Section Ill.
19. This article treats "redress" as the umbrella concept for government and private initiatives
aimed at reparatory justice-healing the continuing wounds of historic injustice. "Reparations," now
tending to emphasize money payments, and "reconciliation," focusing generally on building new
relationships, are two related, overlapping aspects of redress. See infra Section III.
20. See Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, American Reparations Theory and Practice, supra note 12,
at 3-4 (developing the reparatory justice framework of Social Healing Through Justice); see also infra
note 156 (defining "established democracies"). Scholars examining reparations for African Americans
have been at the forefront of advancing redress as an aspect of civil rights and equality jurisprudence.
See, e.g., BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO & CON, supra note 8; Charles J. Ogletree Jr., Tulsa Reparations:
The Survivors' Story, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13 (2004); Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It
Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 429 (1998); Vincene
Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations for African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV
597 (1993); Rhonda V. Magee, The Master's Tools, from the Bottom Up: Responses to African-
American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863
(1993); Alfreda Robinson, Corporate Social Responsibility and African American Reparations:
Jubilee, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 309 (2003); Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 7; see generally
HARLON DALTON, RACIAL HEALING: CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES (1995)
(describing how an emphasis on healing has entered civil rights discourse).
21. See generally William C. Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts ": Reparations,
Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. I (2002-
2003) [hereinafter Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts"]; see also William C.
Bradford, Beyond Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice, in BEPRESS LEGAL SERIES
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governmental embrace of recognition and responsibility. However,
particularly with the former Bush administration, the assessment also
shows starkly inadequate reconstruction and reparation-incomplete if not
failed efforts to heal.22
In Section V, the Article then illuminates some of the consequences of
a country's incomplete or failed healing efforts-the continuing pain,
dislocation, and social divisions. It also offers insight into how
international scrutiny of a government's human rights record can
reinvigorate domestic redress initiatives. It does this by employing the
framework to critique Japan's recently rejuvenated efforts to redress the
long-standing harms to the indigenous Ainu in the face of sharp
international criticism about Japan's unredressed historic injustices.
The Social Healing Through Justice analysis of the United States-
Native Hawaiian (domestic) and Japan-Ainu (international) initiatives
sheds light on redress efforts in four ways. First, it highlights the
inadequacy of governmental efforts to repair long-term systemic damage
when those efforts focus mainly on "compensation," without attention to
24the psychological, cultural, and institutional aspects of reparatory justice.
Second, it reveals the salutary potential of social healing efforts as well as
the emptiness of insincere apologies and unfulfilled promises of repair.25
Third, it offers strategic insight into how a country's geopolitical concerns
about perceived legitimacy as a democracy committed to civil and human
• 26
rights influence the country's future reparatory actions. And finally, it
underscores the need for the continuing development of a workable
framework for guiding and assessing redress initiatives.
The stakes are high. The time is ripe to grapple with reparatory justice
and reframe redress.
(2004) (Paper 170).
22. The Social Healing Through Justice framework entails inquiry into recognition,
responsibility, reconstruction, and reparation. See infra Section IlI.C.
23. See infra Section V. Until the mid-1990s, the Japanese government attempted to ignore the
ways that its colonization of Hokkaido harmed the indigenous Ainu there. "Japanese government
officials brushed the Ainu people into history's dustbin." Mark Levin, Essential Commodities and
Racial Justice: Using Constitutional Protection of Japan's Indigenous Ainu People to Inform
Understandings of the United States and Japan, 33 NYU J. INT'L LAW AND POL. 419, 439-441 (2001)
[hereinafter Levin, Essential Commodities]. In addition, the early scholars and mass media that did
focus on the Ainu situation mainly referred to the Ainu people as a dying race that was "doomed to
extinction from the face of the Earth." Id. at 438 n.70; RICHARD SIDDLE, RACE, RESISTANCE AND THE
AINU OF JAPAN 77-85 (1996).
24. See infra Section VI (discussing Japan's incomplete reparatory efforts).
25. See infra Sections IV and V.
26. See infra Section V.
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II. JAPANESE AMERICAN REDRESS:
A FOUNDATION FOR RECENT REPARATIONS AND RECONCILIATION
INITIATIVES
As developed in later sections, reparations theory and practice now
stand at a crossroads, 27 and reconciliation's bright promise of social healing
has evolved into a mid-life crisis. 28  Yet, demands for varying forms of
redress persist. In order to chart a path forward by unraveling the
complexities of reparatory initiatives, we begin with a brief foundational
account of Japanese American redress. We do not detail the internment
29
27. See Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, American Reparations Theory and Practice, supra note 12,
at 1.
28. See infra Section III.C.
29. In brief, as a prelude to the internment, federal and state governments on the West Coast
stereotyped and discriminated against Asians in America from the mid-1800s through the 1940s. See
JUAN F. PEREA, ET AL., RACE AND RACES CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 427-40
(2001). The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 banned all Chinese from entry into the U.S. and forbade
federal and state courts from granting citizenship to Chinese nationals. See id. at 383. States, such as
California, forbade Asian farmers from owning agricultural lands through the California Alien Land
Law and banned Chinese from employment by government and businesses. Id. at 398-400; see also
Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth Century Alien Land Law As a Prelude to the
Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 371 (1998); FRANK WU, YELLOW - RACE IN AMERICAN BEYOND BLACK
AND WHITE (2002) [hereinafter WU, YELLOW]; Gabriel Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race:
Doubts About Yick Wo, U. ILL. L. REV. 1359 (2008); Eric K. Yamamoto and Geoff Sogi, Korematsu v.
United States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (2008). At the peak
of "yellow peril" fear, racist groups, such as the Native Sons of the Golden West and the Japanese and
Korean Exclusion League, fought to exclude Asians from all facets of economic and social life. See Joel
B. Grossman, The Japanese American Cases and the Vagaries of Constitutional Adjudication in
Wartime: An Institutional Perspective, U. HAW. L. REV. 649 (1997); see also PERSONAL JUSTICE
DENIED: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS 37
(1982) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF
CIVILIANS].
Following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, this anti-Asian sentiment erupted.
YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG & WU, RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATION, supra note 7, at 96-100.
Journalists and politicians scapegoated an entire race of citizens and immigrants. Yamamoto & Sogi,
Korematsu v. United States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
(2008). California's governor and attorney general (Earl Warren) "took up the familiar anti-Japanese
cry." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, at 5.
On February 19, 1942, facing public fear of a West Coast attack, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
issued Executive Order 9066, which gave carte blanche to the military to impose civilian restrictions to
prevent espionage and sabotage. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942); see
generally GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE-
AMERICANS (2001). The Order effectively branded all Americans of Japanese ancestry as national
security threats and authorized their mass incarceration. In March of 1942, Congress enacted Public
Law 503, which criminalized any violation of military orders. Act of Mar. 21, 1843, Pub. L. No. 77-
503, 56 Stat. 173 (1942); see Grossman, The Japanese American Cases.
Subsequently, Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, head of Western Defense Command and
an early advocate for the internment, issued racial curfew and exclusion orders. Eric K. Yamamoto &
Liann Ebesugawa, Report on Redress: The Japanese American Internment, in THE HANDBOOK OF
REPARATIONS, 257-283 (Pablo de Greif ed., 2007). DeWitt's orders made no distinction between
Japanese nationals and American citizens of Japanese ancestry. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS 65-66 (1982). He announced that the
"Japanese are an enemy race" and notwithstanding American citizenship, the "racial strains are
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or the legal challenges during World War II3°-many have already done
so." Rather, we focus on the redress movement and the political and legal
ways it contributed to contemporary understandings of reparatory justice.
undiluted" - "a Jap is a Jap." YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG & Wu, RIGHTS AND REPARATION,
supra note 7, at 99; see also Bannai, supra note 7; Serrano & Minami, Korematsu v. United States: A
"Constant Caution, " supra note 3.
Without individual charges or hearings to determine disloyalty, DeWitt's orders forced over
120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry (including 70,000 U.S. citizens) into desolate barbed wire prisons
throughout the western states (two in California, Arkansas, and Arizona and one in Idaho, Wyoming,
Utah, and Colorado). Sandra Taylor, The Internment of Americans of Japanese Ancestry, in WHEN
SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH, supra note 9, at 166-67. These sites, euphemistically called "camps," were
chosen for their stark remote locations. Id. Internees lost businesses, homes, personal belongings, and
family members. See Yamamoto & Sogi, supra note 29. In contrast, despite attempts by German
nationals to sabotage East Coast military facilities, individuals of German and Italian ancestry were not
subjected to the same mass racial incarceration. ROGER DANIELS, CONCENTRATION CAMP, U.S.A.;
JAPANESE AMERICANS AND WORLD WAR II 39 (1971).
30. In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of concededly loyal
Japanese American Fred Korematsu for refusing to abide by the military exclusion order. Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 215 (1944). Gordon Hirabayashi and Minoru Yasui also challenged the curfew
and exclusion orders. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United-States, 320
U.S. 115 (1943). Korematsu challenged the constitutionality of the exclusion and detention, asserting
that racial incarceration violated Japanese Americans' right to Due Process and Equal Protection under
the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215; see also PETER IRONS,
JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 93-96 (1993)
[hereinafter IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR]. The federal district court adjudged Korematsu guilty and
sentenced him to a five-year probationary term. See Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432 (1943).
In 1944, the Supreme Court affirmed, deferring to the government's assertion that military
necessity justified the exclusion. Id. Justice Hugo Lafayette Black, a former Alabama Ku Klux Klan
member, wrote the Court's majority opinion. Samuel D. Thurman, Jr., Commentary, Mr. Justice Black,
I STAN, L. REV. 578 (1949). Black stated that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect" and that courts must subject such restrictions to "the most
rigid scrutiny." Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. He also explained that "nothing short of apprehension by
the proper military authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety" would justify racial
restrictions. Id. at 218.
The majority, however, failed to subject the government's racial exclusion and incarceration
to the "most rigid scrutiny." Id. at 215; see Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited, supra note 6; Greg
Robinson and Toni Robinson, Korematsu and Beyond: Japanese Americans and the Origins of Strict
Scrutiny, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (2005); Reggie Oh & Frank Wu, The Evolution of Race in the
Law: The Supreme Court Moves from Approving Internment of Japanese Americans to Disapproving
Affirmative Action, I MICH. J. RACE & L. 165 (1996). Rather, it deferred to the government's military
necessity assertion, declaring, "we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities
and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could
not be precisely and quickly ascertained." Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217; see infra notes 50-62 and
accompanying text (addressing the reopening of the Korematsu case).
31. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF
CIVILIANS, supra note 29; IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 30; ROGER DANIELS, THE DECISION TO
RELOCATE THE JAPANESE AMERICANS (1975); MICHIE WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY (1976);
YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG & WU, RIGHTS AND REPARATION, supra note 7; Eugene Rostow, The
Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945). For a discussion of pre-intemment
anti-Asian sentiment embodied in law, see Aoki, supra note 29; see generally WU, YELLOW, supra note
29; Chin, supra note 29.
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A. Grassroots Redress Movement
In the late 1960s, with the African American Civil Rights movement
as backdrop, Japanese Americans launched a campaign of public education
and legislative lobbying in support of internment reparations.32 Ethnic
studies programs and Asian American students' Yellow Power activism
shed new light on the internment and the West Coast history of anti-Asian
agitation.33 In this setting the question arose: "How does a government
repair serious harm it inflicts upon its own citizens, particularly when those
citizens are members of a minority racial group targeted because of their
race? In particular, what kinds of remedies [can be shaped] for the
internment of 120,000 Japanese Americans during World War II?
''34
Although initially unpopular with the Japanese American community, the
redress movement gradually gained support from the Japanese American
Citizens League and second and third generation Japanese Americans.
Hawai'i and California Asian American political leaders also played
pivotal roles.35 Yet without a legal foundation, the reparations movement
stalled in the late 1970s. Two events in the early 1980s rejuvenated the
movement.
First, with grassroots community support, Japanese American
members of Congress ushered through seemingly innocuous legislation
creating an internment study commission whose thorough investigation
uncovered new information and provided the solid factual foundation for
redress.36 The Commission's 1983 Report, Personal Justice Denied,37
recounted the first-time testimony of many internees about the trauma of
race-based, indefinite, false imprisonment. It also found "a number of
federal civilian and military agencies contradicting the report of General
DeWitt [who issued the exclusion and internment orders] that military
necessity justified exclusion and internment." 38 Observing that the military
implemented internment orders largely after any danger of a West Coast
attack had passed, the Congressional Report concluded the internment was
a result of "wartime hysteria, failure of political leadership, and racial
prejudice."39
32. Yamamoto, Social Meanings of Redress, supra note 1, at 225.
33. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG & Wu, RIGHTS AND REPARATION, supra note 7, at 279.
34. Id. at 278.
35. Hawai'i Senators Daniel Inouye and Spark Matsunaga, Congresswomen Patsy Mink and Pat
Saiki, and Governor George Ariyoshi provided the first strong Asian American political presence.
YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG & Wu, RIGHTS AND REPARATION, supra note 7, at 278. California
Representatives Robert Matsui and Norman Mineta also played pivotal congressional roles. Leslie
Hatamiya, Institutions and Interest Groups: Understanding the Passage of the Japanese American
Redress Bill, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH, 194-96 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999).
36. See id.
37. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS,
supra note 29.
38. Id. at 18.
39. Id. The Report also rejected as unfounded the government's contention that World War I1
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Second, also in 1983, Fred Korematsu reopened his World War II
exclusion case, asking the San Francisco federal district court to vacate his
forty-year old conviction.4 0  A core of a dozen volunteer lawyers, mostly
young, third-generation Japanese Americans whose parents had been
interned, formed the legal team.4' Fifty more lawyers, students, and
supporters pitched in. Raising $50,000 through small contributions to
defray litigation cost, the Korematsu coram nobis legal team also labored
in the arena of public opinion. The lawyers spoke in schools, churches, and
community halls. They also spoke on radio and appeared on local and• • 42
national television.
Korematsu's aims, they explained, were extraordinary-to overturn
what the Supreme Court had validated four decades earlier and to thereby
assure that "this will never happen again to any American citizen of any
race, creed or color.' '43  The claims? Newly declassified government
documents from World War II, discovered by researchers Peter Irons and
Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, revealed three crucial facts:
Japanese diplomatic "Magic" cables showed Japan's successful recruitment of Japanese Americans for
the war effort. Id. at 475; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
Magic cables argument); cf MICHELLE MALKIN, IN DEFENSE OF INTERNMENT: THE CASE FOR RACIAL
PROFILING IN WORLD WAR II AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004) (arguing that the Magic cables justified
the internment); LILLIAN BAKER, THE CONCENTRATION CAMP CONSPIRACY: A SECOND PEARL
HARBOR (1981) (defending the internment); but see David Forman, Rethinking the Wisdom of Japanese
American Internment, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Aug. 9, 2004, at Al 1, available at
http://archives.starbulletin.com/2004/08/09/editorial/commentary.html (explaining gaps in Malkin's
factual recitations and reasoning); Fred Korematsu, Do We Really Need to Relearn the Lessons of
Japanese American Internment?, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 16, 2004, at B9 (highlighting Malkin's failure to
acknowledge racial scapegoating during times of national fear).
40. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
41. YAMAMOTO, CHON, lzUMt, KANG & Wu, RIGHTS AND REPARATION, supra note 7, at 366.
42. Id.
43. PETER IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT
CASES 20 (1989). In his Korematsu dissent, Justice Murphy charged that the majority's decision "falls
into the ugly abyss of racism." Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233. According to Murphy, the majority
blindly accepted as "fact" General DeWitt's statements about Japanese American espionage and
sabotage and about the lack of time to hold individual loyalty hearings. Id. at 241; see DeWitt, Final
Report, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942 [hereinafter Final Report], reprinted in
Korematsu Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, filed with the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, January 19, 1983 (No. CR-2763W) [hereinafter Korematsu Coram Nobis
Petition].
Murphy also dismantled the government's cultural contentions about inherent Japanese
American disloyalty, finding the government's assertions to be "largely an accumulation of much of the
misinformation, half-truths and insinuations that for years have been directed against Japanese
Americans by people with racial and economic prejudices-the same people who have been among the
foremost advocates of the evacuation." Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 239. Murphy concluded that the
"forced exclusion was the result of... the erroneous assumption of racial guilt rather than bona fide
military necessity .... I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of racism." Id. at 235-41.
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I. Before the internment, all involved governmental intelligence
services informed the highest officials of the military and War and
Justice Departments that West Coast Japanese Americans posed no
serious danger, and there was no justification for internment;
44
2. General DeWitt based his internment decision on racial stereotypes
of "inherently disloyal" Japanese Americans; 45 and
3. The military and War and Justice Departments concealed, altered,
and destroyed crucial evidence and deliberately misled the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1944 when it considered Korematsu's case and
accepted as true the government contention of military necessity.
46
44. All of the American intelligence services investigating possible disloyalty by Japanese
Americans directly contradicted DeWitt's Report. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG & Wu, RIGHTS
AND REPARATION, supra note 7, at 290. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) reported after the Pearl
Harbor attack that "Japanese Americans posed little danger to military security ... and that most of
those persons 'are either already in custodial detention or are members of ... groups already fairly well
known' to the ONI or FBI." K.D. Ringle, Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Department of Navy Office of
Naval Intelligence, Report on Japanese Question (Jan. 26, 1942) reprinted in YAMAMOTO, CHON,
IZUMI, KANG & Wu, RIGHTS AND REPARATION, supra note 7, at 300.
The FBI rejected as unfounded alleged instances of espionage and sabotage cited by DeWitt
and concluded that the mass internment plan was based on "public and political pressure rather than on
factual data." Memorandum, J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (Feb. 2, 1942),
reprinted in REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS,
supra note 29. The Federal Communications Commission also rejected DeWitt's assertion that Japanese
Americans engaged in radio signaling to Japanese forces. Memorandum, James Fly, Commissioner,
Federal Communications Commission (Apr. 4, 1944) reprinted in YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG &
WU, RIGHTS AND REPARATION, supra note 7, at 303. These memorandums were exhibits to the
Korematsu Coram Nobis Petition. Korematsu Coram Nobis Petition, supra note 43; see generally
IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 30 (analyzing World War I1 government documents undercutting
the government's claim of "military necessity").
45. DeWitt's Final Report asserted the mass racial internment was justified because "there was
evidence of disloyalty on the part of some" and "the need for action was great, and time was short."
Final Report, supra note 43. These pivotal "facts" were false, and recently discovered government
documents showed that General DeWitt and high-level Justice and War Department officials knew this,
suppressed the truth, and deliberately destroyed key evidence to mislead the Supreme Court. See supra
note 5.
In fact, Japanese Americans had not committed espionage or sabotage, and the government
had ample time to hold individual hearings. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24. There was no "military
necessity." See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF
CIVILIANS, supra note 29, at 5-8. The American Intelligence Services directly and forcefully recited
these factual realities to DeWitt before the internment and before his Report was submitted to the
Supreme Court as evidence. See infra notes 46-47. DeWitt acknowledged in the original version of his
Final Report that time was not a factor-the government, he said, due to Japanese American racial
characteristics, simply could never "separate the sheep from the goats." Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 598.
This original version directly contradicted the arguments the War and Justice Departments planned to
make to the Supreme Court. Korematsu Coram Nobis Petition, supra note 43, at Exhibit D. The War
Department therefore forced DeWitt to alter his original Report to hide the military's actual racial
reasons for the exclusion and detention. Final Report, supra note 43.
46. Justice and War Department officials deliberately suppressed crucial intelligence reports
rejecting any factual bases for mass racial incarceration. See Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited, supra
note 6, at 17. Appalled by the government's unethical "suppression of evidence," the two Justice
Department attorneys drafting the government's Korematsu legal brief attempted to alert the Supreme
Court to "intentional falsehoods" in the DeWitt Report. Memorandum, Edward Ennis, Director, Alien
Enemy Control Unit, U.S. Department of Justice (Sept. 30, 1944), Korematsu Coram Nobis Petition,
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With this newly uncovered evidence, Korematsu filed his coram nobis
petition on January 19, 1983.4' The petition claimed that Korematsu's
conviction in 1942 for resisting the military's internment orders and its
affirmation by the Supreme Court in 1944 rested on a "long-standing,
pervasive and unlawful governmental scheme designed to mislead and
defraud the courts and the nation.
48
Federal District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel agreed and, finding a
"manifest injustice, ' 49  vacated Korematsu's conviction. Patel first
cautioned, "the judicial process is seriously impaired when the
government's law enforcement officers violate their ethical obligations to
the court." In ringing oratory, reminiscent of Justice Jackson's "Loaded
Weapon" dissent in Korematsu,50 Patel then highlighted the sharp need for
presidential and congressional accountability and underscored the
significance of Korematsu to American democracy:
supra note 43, at Exhibit B.
John Burling inserted a footnote into the government's draft brief to advise the Supreme
Court that the Justice Department possessed clear evidence refuting the government's claims of
espionage. Korematsu Coram Nobis Petition, supra note 43, at Exhibit AA. Memorandum, John
Burling, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice (Sept. 11, 1944). However, high officials in the Justice
Department stopped Burling's effort and revised the footnote to hide the existence of the assessments of
all involved intelligence services refuting the government's argument of military necessity. See IRONS,
JUSTtCE AT WAR, supra note 30, at 93-96, 288-92.
47. See Korematsu Coram Nobis Petition, supra note 43 (describing usage of coram nobis, a rare
writ of error, as the procedural vehicle for reopening a criminal case where the defendant has served his
sentence and where new proof has emerged establishing egregious government misconduct in the
prosecution amounting to "manifest" injustice); see also Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited, supra note
6, at 17.
48. Id.
49. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
50. Justice Jackson's dissent prophesized the Supreme Court majority decision's long-term harm
to American democracy. In upholding mass racial incarceration without credible proof of necessity,
Jackson charged that the majority had established a dangerous legal principle-a "loaded weapon." Id.
at 249.
The Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal
procedure and of transplanting American citizens . . . [the] principle lies about like a loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an
urgent need. Id.
See Eric K. Yamamoto and Susan Kiyomi Serrano, The Loaded Weapon, 27 AMERASIA J. 51 (2002)
(analyzing the import of Justice Jackson's "loaded weapon warning" for post-September I h America);
Susan Akram & Kevin Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001:
The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295 (2002) (describing
government scapegoating and racial profiling after the 9/11 attack); Saito, At the Heart of Law, supra
note 7 (revealing government's COINTEL program's gross subversion of American Civil Liberties in
the name of national security); Leti Volpp, The Citizen as Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2003)
(analyzing racializing of Arab Americans as foreign terrorists); Margaret Chon and Donna E. Arzt,
Walking While Muslim, 68 J. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215 (2005) [hereinafter Chon & Arzt]. A
prominent commentator at the time described the Korematsu case, along with the Hirabayashi and
Yasui cases, as a civil liberties disaster. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases, supra note 31.
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As a legal precedent [Korematsu] is now recognized as having very
limited application. As historical precedent it stands as a constant caution
that in times of war or declared military necessity our institutions must be
vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees. It stands as a caution that
in times of distress the shield of military necessity and national security
must not be used to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and
accountability. It stands as a caution that in times of international
hostility and antagonisms our institutions, legislative, executive and
judicial, must be prepared to exercise their authority to protect all citizens
from the petty fears that are so easily aroused.•
5
In granting Korematsu's coram nobis petition, Patel also energized the
political movement to rectify the human harms of the presidential,
congressional and military actions that "caused needless suffering and
shame for thousands of Americans. 52
B. Civil Liberties Act of 1988:
Apology, Reparations and Public Education
With the Congressional Commission's Report, the coram nobis court
victories, and the pending Hohri class action lawsuit,53 a renewed
grassroots and legislative lobbying campaign pushed for redress. Japanese
American redress received strong political support from African American,
Jewish American, and other civil rights groups 4  Despite strong
opposition, with the support of Asian American members of Congress, the
collective efforts culminated in the Civil Liberties Act of 1988. Signed by
President Ronald Reagan at a time when the United States sought
legitimacy as a democracy committed to civil and human rights in its fight
to end the Cold War,55 the Act committed the President to formally
apologize for the internment, and it authorized a reparation payment of
$20,000 for each surviving internee who was a U.S. citizen or legal resident
51. Id. at 1420. See also RICHARD DELGADO AND JEAN STEFANCIC, JUSTICE AT WAR (2004)
(analyzing post-9/11 tension between civil liberties and national security); Chon & Arzt, supra note 50
(describing the racial scapegoating of Arab Americans and Muslims after 9/11); Jerry Kang, Recent
Development: Thinking Through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11, 9 ASIAN L.J. 195, 195 (2002). See also
Jerry Kang, Judgments Judged and Wrongs Remembered: Examining the Japanese American Civil
Liberties Cases on their Sixtieth Anniversary: Watching the Watchers: Enemy Combatants in the
Internment's Shadow, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 255 (2005).
52. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1987) (vacating curfew conviction
of Gordon Hirabayashi in companion coram nobis case); Yasui v. United States, 772 F. Supp. 1496 (9th
Cir. 1985) (vacating conviction of Minoru Yasui in companion coram nobis case).
53. The Hohri class action lawsuit sought damages for loss of freedom and property. Although
the lawsuit was dismissed for statute of limitations, its appeal put pressure on Congress regarding
reparations. Hohri v. United States, 586 F.Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984), affd in part and rev'd in part 782
F.2d 227 (1986), vacated 482 U.S. 64 (1987), on remand 847 F.2d 779 (1988), cert. denied 488 U.S.
925 (1988).
54. See Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 7.
55. See Yamamoto, Social Meanings of Redress, supra note 1, at 231.
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alien at the time of internment.56 It also established an internment fund for
public education.
In a letter accompanying each reparations check, President George
H.W. Bush apologized:
A monetary sum and words alone cannot restore lost years or erase
painful memories; neither can they fully convey our Nation's resolve to
rectify injustice and to uphold the rights of individuals. We can never
fully right the wrongs of the past. But we can take a clear stand for justice
and recognize that serious injustices were done to Japanese Americans
during World War II. In enacting a law calling for restitution and offering
a sincere apology, your fellow Americans have, in a very real sense,
renewed their traditional commitment to the ideals of freedom, equality,
and justice.57
For many internees the American government's betrayal cut so deeply
into the human spirit that this presidential apology was essential to any
kind of repair. Amy Iwasaki Mass, incarcerated as a child and now a social
worker, recounted the trauma:
I also loved America. I get goose bumps when I sing the Star Spangled
Banner. I believed what our teachers taught regarding what a great
country America is .... We were told that we were being put away for
our own safety .... The pain, trauma, and stress of the incarceration
experience was so overwhelming we used the psychological defense
mechanism of repression, denial, and rationalization to keep us from
facing the truth. The truth was that the government we trusted, the
country we loved, the nation to which we had pledged loyalty had
betrayed us, had turned against us.
5 8
Japanese American redress also encompassed public education. In
addition to the apology and symbolic payment, Congress created and
partially financed the internment Public Education Fund.59  The Fund
generated fresh historical internment research, analysis of the need for
governmental national security restructuring, and insight into Japanese
60American cultural values and practices. It supported multiple creative
and scholarly projects, including curricula for high school, undergraduate
61and law students, documentary films, plays, fine arts displays, and more.
56. See MAKI, KITANO & BERTHOLD, supra note 5.
57. See YAMAMOTO, CHON, lzUMI, KANG & WU, RIGHTS AND REPARATION, supra note 7, at 401
(quoting standard letter of apology from President Bush to former internees).
58. MAKI, KITANO & BERTHOLD, supra note 5, at 107.
59. See id. at 225-27.
60. Id.
61. The Fund covered seven categories of projects (curriculum, landmarks and institutions,
community development, arts and media, research, national fellowships and research resources), and
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For many former internees public education became an integral part of
the healing process, exemplified by the Smithsonian Museum's permanent
internment and redress exhibition and the national internment memorial in
Washington, D.C. 6' According to a Japanese American observer, the
Public Education Fund's impact extended far beyond the specific projects:
"What was evident [from the education projects] ... was that a great deal
of personal [pain and] friction had been replaced with a sense of
community accomplishment" 63 -an aspect of social healing.
III. REDRESS EVOLUTION:
FROM REPARATIONS TO RECONCILIATION
A. Reparations at the Crossroads
Since the United States apologized to World War II Japanese
American internees and made individual payments, reparations discourse
and advocacy have been the refrain of the redress realm.64  Many
reparations movements in established democracies cite Japanese American
redress-either as model or moral precedent. 6' Reparations claims now on
also created a "community" of redress movement participants who convened at the 1997 "Voices of
Japanese American Redress" conference. Id.
62. Interview with Dr. Franklin Odo, Smithsonian Museum, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 8, 2008)
(observing significance of the exhibition and memorial, and public education generally, to healing for
former Japanese American internees).
63. Id.
64. See generally YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG & Wu, RIGHTS AND REPARATION, supra note
7.
65. See, e.g., Hung, supra note 7, at 195-96 (discussing grassroots Asian American activism
supporting WWII comfort women reparations claims against Japan which draws upon the "Asian
American effort to right the wrongs of history . . . [and] obtain redress from the United States
government for the injustices of World War 11 internment"); Zachary F. Bookman, A Role for Courts in
Reparations, 20 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 75, 78-81 (2007) (observing that Japanese American redress is the
"paradigmatic case for how reparations can be awarded through the political process based on [t]hen
illicit wrongs, committed after a Federal dictate, to a [d]iscrete group of people, for a [s]et duration of
time, and with a [d]emonstrable link to the present"); Maxine Burkett, Reconciliation and
Nonrepetition: A New Paradigm for African-American Reparations, 86 OR. L. REV. 99, 137 (2007) (the
"key differences between the success of the Japanese-American reparations campaign and the centuries-
old failures of African-American reparations shed light on why African-Americans are uniquely locked
out of reparations gains, and, at the same time, raise a red flag for the entire enterprise if it proceeds
without the nonrepetition element"); Eric L. Muller, Fixing a Hole: How the Criminal Law can Bolster
Reparations Theory, 47 B.C. L. REV 659, 671 (2006) (the "success of the Japanese American redress
movement made it a sort of 'poster child' of American reparations theory--a 'monumental,' even
'unique' political achievement that had, and continues to have, the potential to serve as a model for the
redress claims of other victims of historical injustices"); Kang, Denying Prejudice, supra note 7, at
999 ("[T]he Japanese American redress movement generally has been highlighted as a critical precedent
for similar redress movements, ranging from African slavery to Hawaiian self-determination"); William
Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts, "supra note 2 1, at 9 (citing Japanese American
reparations as significant for framing contemporary Native American claims); Chad W. Bryan,
Precedent for Reparations? A Look at Historical Movements for Redress and Where Awarding
Reparations for Slavery Might Fit, 54 ALA. L. REV. 599, 614-15 (2003) (proposing a reparations plan
for slavery to include an apology and a public education fund patterned after the 1988 Civil Liberties
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the table in the United States encompass African Americans (slavery, Jim
Crow segregation, specific atrocities), 66  Native Americans
(mismanagement of 1 1 million acres of trust lands), 6' Native Hawaiians
68(taking of native lands and denial of self-governance), Japanese Latin
Americans (kidnapping of Latin Americans during World War II and
holding them indefinitely in U.S. internment camps as hostages),69 the
Latino "Bracero" itinerant farm workers (economic exploitation of invited
farm workers from Mexico),70 the indigenous Chamorus in the United
States Territory of Guam (destruction of ancestral lands and culture), 71 and
the Filipino U.S. World War II veterans (denial of promised full veterans
benefits)." Recent international reparations claims lodged in United States
courts include claims by European Holocaust survivors, the "Korean
Comfort Women ,'7 and the victims of political torture and murder by the
former American-supported Marcos regime in the Philippines.75
Act); Natsu Taylor Saito, Beyond Reparations: Accommodating Wrongs or Honoring Resistance?, I
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 27 (2003) (examining modem reparations movements through the
lens of Japanese American redress). See also Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, American Reparations
Theory and Practice, supra note 12, at 18-20 (the Japanese American internment "linked reparations
discourse to legal and political movements in an attempt to make reparations a reality for many
groups"); Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 7 (exploring ways that Japanese American
redress impacts pending African American reparations claims).
66. See BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO AND CON, supra note 8; REDRESS FOR HISTORICAL
INJUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 9.
67. Cobell v. Kempthome, 455 F.3d 317 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (previously Cobell v. Norton and
Cobell v. Babbit) (pending class action against the U.S. Department of Interior for full accounting of
mismanagement of trust funds).
68. See infra Section IV.
69. Mochizuki v. U.S., 43 Fed. Cl. 97 (1999) (class action by Japanese Latin Americans settled
by some claimants for $5,000 and a general apology). See Saito, Justice Held Hostage, supra note 7;
Japanese Peruvians Still Waiting for Their Redress, PACIFIC CITIZEN, Aug. 15-Sept. 4, 2008, at 3.
70. See Kevin R. Johnson, International Human Rights Class Actions: New Frontiers for Group
Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 643 (2004) (describing "Bracero Program" workers' reparations
claims against the United States and Mexican governments and banks).
71. See Julian Aguon, Other Arms. The Power of a Dual Rights Legal Strategy for the Chamoru
People of Guam Using the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in U.S. Courts, HAW. L.
REV (forthcoming 2009).
72. During World War 11, the United States formally promised Filipino soldiers that if they would
fight for America they would be given full veterans' benefits. After the war, the United States reneged
on the compact, and the soldiers continued to seek reparations for decades. Benefits for the remaining
WWII Filipino veterans were granted in 2009. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (benefits for Filipino veterans were included in the stimulus bill after
the Senate failed to act on the Filipino Veterans Equity Act). See also Filipino Veterans Equity Act of
2008, H.R. 6897, 110th Cong. (2008) (passed by House and received in Senate Sept. 23, 2008); Filipino
Veterans Equity Act of 2007, S. 57, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced to Senate Jan. 4, 2007).
73. See generally Robert A. Swift, Holocaust Litigation and Human Rights Jurisprudence, in
HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY (Michael J. Bazyler &
Roger P. Alford eds., 2006) (claims for slave labor, bank deposits and stolen art).
74. See generally Shellie K. Park, Broken Silence: Redressing the Mass Rape and Sexual
Enslavement of Asian Women by the Japanese Government in an Appropriate Forum, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L.
& POL'Y J. 23 (2002) (still pending reparations claims by mainly Korean women forced into sexual
slavery by the Japanese government and military during World War 11).
75. See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994);
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Yet, despite vigorous public advocacy and strong international
support, recent reparations claims in American courts and legislatures have
foundered.76  Those claims, particularly by African Americans for the
harms of slavery and legalized segregation, have encountered fierce
opposition from scholars, advocacy groups, and policymakers as well as
from a segment of middle-America that characterizes reparations as
nothing more than a disguised unfounded quest for money."
United States courts have blocked reparations compensation suits on
procedural grounds, including lack of standing and the statute of
limitations.78 And even reparations supporters have expressed concern
about the public narrowing of the very idea of reparations-that the
concept now tends to mean individual money payments and exclude
apologies, institutional restructuring, or community restoration.79
Moreover, reparations programs in both established and transitioning
democracies have faced challenges from within (supporters questioning
whether reparations programs are actually fostering social repair) 80 and
from without (opponents highlighting poor administration and
corruption).8 Touted and criticized, reparations theory and practice stand
at a cross-roads.82
B. Toward Reconciliation
For these reasons, the language of redress is shifting away from
reparations and towards social healing, or what is often broadly termed
reconciliation.83 Indeed, with an emphasis on the individual and societal
benefits of storytelling, apologies, symbolic payments, and public
In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992) (class action
in U.S. courts on behalf of Filipino victims of political torture and murder by the Ferdinand Marcos
regime).
76. See BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO AND CON, supra note 8, at 121-32.
77. See id at 75-87 (describing strident opposition to reparations claims). See, e.g., Robert W.
Tracinski, America's "Field of Blackbirds": How the Campaign for Reparations for Slavery
Perpetuates Racism, 3 J.L. SoC'y 145 (2002).
78. See Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, American Reparations Theory and Practice, supra note 12,
at 24-25 (describing failure of recent reparations lawsuits).
79. Id.
80. See South Africa: Special Report on Democracy-Black Economic Empowerment, UN Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?Reportld=49461;
Mamphela Ramphele, Reconciliation Is Not Enough, Dec. 1, 2006, www.mg.co.za/printformat/single/
2006-12-01-reconciliation-is-not-enough; Jessica Bell, State Ignored TRC Findings, Says Kasrils, CAPE
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2008, at 6, http://www.capetimes.co.za/index.php?fSectionld=353 I&fArticleld= vn200
81029054650703C702655.
81. See Jessica Bell, TRC's Unanswered Questions, CAPE TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008, at 10,
http://www.iol.co.za/general/news/newsprint.php?art id=vn20081111053618446C922952&sf=.
82. See Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, American Reparations Theory and Practice, supra note 12.
83. Id. For additional reading on the subject, see THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP
RECONCILIATION (Arie Nadler et al. eds., 2008), and THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES (Will Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir, eds., 2008).
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education, reconciliation is high on many established democracies' political
84
agendas. Some reconciliation initiatives are highly structured and fully
supported. Others are marked by fits and starts and reflect only partial
steps. In light of myriad reconciliation efforts, we are in the midst of what
some call an Age of Reconciliation.
85
In 2008, for example, the U.S Senate moved to acknowledge the
86nation's mistreatment of Native Americans and Native Alaskans, and the
House of Representatives apologized for the horrific harms of slavery andJim Cow • 87
Jim Crow segregation. These apologies followed in the footsteps of path-
breaking apologies for slavery by the states of Florida, Maryland, North
Carolina, Alabama, New Jersey and Virginia." Virginia also expressed
regret over its devastation of Native American life, land, and culture89 --
strong words of remorse and expressions of desire for reconciliation.
Private institutions in the United States are also employing the
language of reconciliation. Brown University undertook a year-long public
educational dialogue about its slavery roots with an eye toward racial
healing9' even as opponents cast the inquiry as a disguise for future
reparations payments. And business giants Wachovia, Aetna, and J.P.
Morgan Chase92 apologized for their historical roles in the slave industry. 93
84. Id. State trial judges and community advocates also embrace reconciliation through
discussions about criminal law and healing in the language of "restorative justice." See Lucy C.
Sanders, Restorative Justice: The Attempt to Rehabilitate Criminal Offenders and Victims, 2
CHARLESTON L. REV. 923, 924 (2008).
85. See Glenn Clifton, The End of History and the Age of Reconciliation. Reconciliation and
Time in Kojeve and Levinas, (May 27, 2005) (prepared for "Thinking the Present" graduate student
conference at University of California, Berkeley). See also WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH, supra note 9,
at 3-11 (describing an "Age of Apology").
86. See Dennis Camire, Apologies for Past Injustices Seen as First Step, THE HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, at A5 (Aug. 20, 2008) (describing the 2008 U.S. apology for the government's
"centuries-old practice of breaking treaties and forcing [native Americans] from their land, which
resulted in mistreatment, death and loss of cultural identity").
87. H.R. Res. 194, 110th Cong. (2008).
88. Recently, Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, Alabama, and New Jersey "expressed regret or
apologized for slavery." Wendy Koch, Lawmakers to Push for U.S. Apology for Slavery, USA TODAY,
Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-02-27-slaveryN.htm. See Virginia Senate
Joint Resolution No. 332, S.J.Res. 332, 2007 Sess. (Va. 2007); Maryland Senate Joint Resolution, S.J.
Res. 6, 2007 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007); North Carolina Senate Joint Resolution 1557, S.J. Res. 1557, Sess
2007 (N.C. 2007); Alabama House Joint Resolution 321, H.J. Res. 321, Sess. 2007 (Ala. 2007); Florida
Senate Concurrent Resolution, S. Con. Res. 2930, 2008 Leg. (Fl. 2008).
89. See Virginia Senate Joint Resolution No. 332, S.J.Res. 332, 2007 Sess. (Va. 2007).
90. Although the several state apologies expressed strong remorse and expressed a desire for
reconciliation, they did not commit to reparatory action. See id.
91. Brown University President Ruth Simmons created a committee to organize educational
forums fostering historical inquiry and "provid[e] factual information and critical perspectives" that
resulted in exposing information linking the University to the slave trade. See Letter from Ruth J.
Simmons, President, Brown University, to Steering Committee on Slavery and Justice, Brown
University, Apr. 30, 2003, available at http://brown.edu/Research/Slavery_Justicelaboutlcharge.html;
Slavery, the Brown Family of Providence and Brown University, Brown U. News Service,
http:lwww.brown.edu/AdministrationlNewsBureaulnfo/Slavery.html.
92. Wachovia apologized "to all Americans, and especially to African Americans and people of
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Native Hawaiians are asserting rights to self-governance and claims to
homelands taken more than a hundred years ago in the illegal U.S.-aided
overthrow of the Hawaiian nation.94 They are calling upon both federal and
state governments to make good on their sixteen-year-long yet stalled•. 95
commitment to fully reconcile with Native Hawaiians. Indeed, in a
remarkable 2008 decision, the Hawai'i Supreme Court reinforced the
state's legislative commitment to reconciliation by commanding that the
governor stop selling formerly native-owned lands (now held in trust by the
state partially for the benefit of Native Hawaiians) until indigenous
Hawaiian reparations claims to these lands are resolved politically.
96
Similarly, in the former British colony of New Zealand, the Waitangi
Tribunal, with an eye on reconciliation, made favorable determinations on
indigenous Mori land claims, 97 although many of those determinations
also await implementing Crown government action amid shifting politicalS 98
alignments. And after years of debate about reconciliation, Australia's
.. ,,99
new prime minister recently apologized to its "stolen generations --
thousands of aboriginal children forcibly taken by the government en
masse from their homes and homelands, separated from their families and
culture, and often violently abused in wretched schools.'00
African descent," but refused reparations. In 2002, Aetna acknowledged its role in insuring slave
owners and apologized, but refused reparations because courts would not award them. J.P. Morgan also
apologized for using more than ten thousand slaves as collateral for loans. See Darryl Fears, Seeking
More Than Apologies for Slavery, WASHINGTON POST, June 20, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/19/AR2005061900694_pf.html. See
also J.P. Morgan Discloses Past Links to Slavery, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 21, 2005, at E2.
93. Only J.P. Morgan committed to reparatory action. It set up a $5 million scholarship program
for African American undergraduates from Louisiana. Ken Magill, From J.P. Morgan Chase, an
Apology and $5 Million in Slavery Reparations, THE SUN, Feb. 1, 2005,
http://www.nysun.com/business/from-jp-morgan-chase-an-apology-and-5-million/8580.
94. See infra Section IV.
95. See id.
96. Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp., 177 P.3d 884, 902 (Haw. 2008)
[hereinafter OHA v. HCDCH]. The United States Supreme Court reversed the state court decision,
which cited both federal and state law, and remanded the case to the state court to determine whether
state law alone provides independent and adequate ground for the injunction. Hawai[]i v. Office of
Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009).
97. See generally Joe Williams, Truth, Reconciliation, and the Clash of Cultures in the Waitangi
Tribunal, AUSTL. & N.Z. LAW AND HISTORY E-JOURNAL 234 (2005).
98. See id. (describing political process for government approval of Tribunal awards).
99. Tim Johnston, Australia Says "Sorry" to Aborigines for Mistreatment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/13/world/asia/13aborigine.html. For the Prime
Minister's apology speech, see The Australian Prime Minister's website,
http://www.pm.gov.au/node/5952 (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). See also Chris Cunneen, Reparations,
Human Rights and the Challenge of Confronting a Recalcitrant Government, in THIRD WORLD LEGAL
STUDIES 2000-2003: INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: RECONSTRUCTION AND REPARATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 (2003); Pamela O'Connor, Reparations for Australia's Removed Aboriginal
Children: Defining the Wrong, in THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES 2000-2003: INTO THE 21IT CENTURY:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REPARATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (2003).
100. Indigenous groups are threatening lawsuits if government reparations are not forthcoming.
See Johnston, supra note 99.
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In the teeth of class action lawsuits and mounting political agitation,
the Canadian government and churches embarked on a far more extensive
program of reconciliation with Canada's stolen generation of aboriginal
children.' °' From the late 1800s, in the name of educational assimilation,
Canada's government forcibly removed aboriginal children from families
and placed them in Native Residential Schools where their mother tongue
was banned and physical and sexual abuse was rampant. 0 2 The Canadian
government formalized its reconciliation commitment in 2005. Its
initiative encompasses apologies, money payments, and the creation of a
healing foundation.0 3
Across the Atlantic Ocean, in the language of reconciliation, former
Prime Minister Tony Blair apologized for the British Empire's sponsorship
of and profiting from slavery in its many colonies. °4 And French leaders
struggled with reconciliation following eruptions over racial
discrimination, particularly against African immigrants in the banlieues.
1°5
Healing the deep wounds of historic injustice is a pressing issue for
Asian democracies as well. In 2006, Junichiro Koizumi, then the Prime
Minister of Japan, invoked the language of reconciliation to frame his
101. Twelve thousand individual claimants launched lawsuits, including two class actions, against
the Canadian government and religious organizations. See also $2B Package Unveiled for Residential
School Survivors, CBC.CA, Nov. 23 2005, available at http://www.tribemagazine.com/board/
showthread.php?t=105565; see also Russell A. Miller, Collective Discursive Democracy as the
Indigenous Right to Self Determination, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 341, 380 (2006/2007) (discussing
conflicting perspectives on indigenous peoples' right to self-determination in international law)
[hereinafter Miller, Collective Discursive Democracy]. The pressure from the Baxter Class Action
resulted in the Canadian Government negotiating an Agreement in Principle, allotting $1.9 billion to
fund a four-pars reparations program. See Baxter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2006] 83 O.R.3d 481
(Can.). See also $2B Package Unveiled for Residential School Survivors, CBC.CA, Nov. 23 2005,
http://www.tribemagazine.com/board/showthread.php?t-l 05565.
102. See Jennifer J. Llewellyn, Dealing with the Legacy of Native Residential School Abuse in
Canada: Litigation, ADR, and Restorative Justice, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 253, 255, 257 (2002). The
Canadian government began to undertake reparations initiatives in 2005. See INT'L CTR. FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, LEGACIES OF INJUSTICE IN ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES 11 (2006) [hereinafter
LEGACIES OF INJUSTICE].
103. The commencement of Canada's much-anticipated Truth and Reconciliation Commission
stalled for two years because of political skirmishing. The Commission was only established in June
2008, and will operate for five years. See TRUTH HEALING RECONCILIATION (2008), available at
http://www.trc-cvr.ca/pdfs/20080818eng.pdf. See infra note 120.
104. See Jonathan Petre, Blair's Deep Sorrow for Slavery 'Is Not Enough,' DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Nov. 28, 2006, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/
2006/11/28/nslave28.xml. See also Esther Stanford, Reflections on a Global Reparations Conference,
NEW NATION, Aug. 14, 2006, at 8 (describing a Pan-African movement for slavery reparations from
Britain and other European countries).
105. See Julie Chi-Hye Suk, Equal By Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of Antidiscrimination
Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 309 (2007) (describing race riots in France, the country's "strict
adherence to race-blindness"); Jennifer Kolstee, Time for Tough Love: How France's Lenient Illegal
Immigration Policies Have Caused Economic Problems Abroad and Social Turmoil Within, 25 PENN
ST. INT'L L. REV. 317, 329, 330-35 (2006) (discussing the history of France's immigration policy and
explaining how France's tension with its former African colonies has caused "French resentment" and
"racism and discrimination against African immigrants").
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political approach to other countries' criticism of Japan's historic human
rights violations, °6 including Japan's denial of belated compensation to
ethnic laborers coerced into service of Japanese corporations during World
War II1 7 and its still-unacknowledged military atrocities in China and
Korea. 10 8  And in 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives called upon
Japan's leaders to apologize to World War II Korean sex slaves and to offer
them meaningful reparations. 09 Then there is also the longstanding but
less well-known question of justice for, and reconciliation with, Japan's
indigenous Ainu." 0
There are many ways to view these wide-ranging post-1988
reconciliation initiatives in established democracies. What is clear is that
collectively they are linked to Japanese American Redress and that they
reflect only a segment of the far larger terrain of national and global
reconciliation efforts.
C. Mid-life Crisis of "Reconciliation"
What is also clear is that the very term "reconciliation" has disparate
meanings and that reconciliation in practice has a mottled record. From the
U.S. Congressionally-expressed commitment to reconcile with Native
Hawaiians; to the path-breaking, highly structured, legislatively-mandated
106. At the 2005 Asia-African Summit in Jakarta, which addressed multilateral efforts in solving
conflicts," Prime Minister Koizumi apologized in the general language of reconciliation:
Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to
the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. Japan squarely faces
these facts of history in a spirit of humility and with a feeling of deep remorse and heartfelt
apology always engraved in mind, Japan has resolutely maintained, consistently since the end
of World War I1, never turning into a military power but an economic power, its principle of
resolving all matters by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of force. Japan once
again states its resolve to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world in the future as
well, prizing the relationship of trust it enjoys with nations of the world.
See Excerpts from Japan PM's Apology, BBC NEWS, April 22, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/4471961.stm. See generally Jamie Sheu, Clash of Asia's Titans: China and Japan's Struggle
for "Reconciliation, " May 1, 2006 (unpublished seminar paper, University of Hawai'i) (on file with
author) (analyzing former Prime Minister Koizumi's rhetoric of reconciliation in addressing charges of
human rights violations by China). With Koizumi's apology as backdrop, Professor Zhang Lianhong,
an expert on the Nanking massacre, recounted the important message of a deceased Japanese WWII
soldier about a "move toward reconciliation." According to Lianhong, "[H]atred of the past is not
impassable-it is possible for China and Japan to get over wartime enmity and move toward
reconciliation and friendship as long as the Japanese government sincerely retrospect history." China
Focus: Nation Mourns Penitent Japanese Veteran Calling for Respect of History, XINHUA GENERAL
NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 5, 2006.
107. In 2007, Japan's Supreme Court rejected compensation claims made by former forced
laborers from China against Nishimatsu Construction. See Norimitsu Onishi, Japan Court Rules
Against Sex Slaves and Laborers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/28/world/asia/28japan.html?pagewanted = &_r I.
108. See generally Sheu, Clash ofAsia 's Titans, supra note 106.
109. H.R. Res. 121, 110th Cong. (2007) (calling on the government to reverse its policy against
reparations for the women forced into sexual slavery for Japanese soldiers).
110. See infra Section IV.
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South Africa Truth and Reconciliation process;".. to the genuine yet flawed
Asian American and African American communities' quest for interracial
rapprochement after neighborhood eruptions;' 12 to the facile, poorly-
conceived program of Sunni-Shiite reconciliation following the upsurge in
violent resistance to United States occupation of Iraq' 3-government and
groups worldwide are invoking "reconciliation" as a mantra for handling
deep-seated conflict."4  In one respect, this is a positive development-a
discourse that embraces bridge-building and peace-making.'"
Yet, as evidenced by the reconciliation efforts discussed earlier, the
very concept of reconciliation is ill-defined. It can mean a highly
organized formal process of truth-telling and reparation, as in South
Africa," 16 or an apparently insincere smokescreen to hide behind-the-scenes
political maneuvering, as in Nepal" 7 and Cambodia." 8  Indeed, Australia's
apology to its "stolen generations" has been sharply criticized by aboriginal
groups angered by the government's refusal to consider reparations,' 9 and
Canada's comprehensive reconciliation initiative has been challenged as
I 11. See Penelope E. Andrews, Reparations for Apartheid's Victims: The Path to Reconciliation?,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1155 (2004); LYN S. GRAYBIL, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA:
MIRACLE OR MODEL (2002); DESMOND TUTU, WITHOUT FORGIVENESS THERE Is No FUTURE 35
(1999); WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH, supra note 9, at 10-11 (describing South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission).
112. See ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT & RECONCILIATION IN POST-
CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 52-53 (1999) [hereinafter YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE] (describing
reconciliation efforts between Asian American and African Americans in neighborhoods over heated
controversies involving Asian storeowners and African American residents).
113. See Joshua Partlow, Top Iraqis Pull Back From Key U.S. Goal, Oct. 8, 2007, WASHINGTON
POST, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/07/AR20071007
01448_pf.html ("The amnesty never materialized, nor has the reconciliation.").
114. See, e.g., Roger Cohen, How Kofi Annan Rescued Kenya, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS,
Aug. 14, 2008, at 51 (describing international intervention and the "Kenya National Dialogue and
Reconciliation" accord creating a power-sharing plan to stem tribal and class violence). See generally
THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 10 (reviewing a wide range of international initiatives in
the context of transitional justice).
115. Id. at 53 (analyzing the 2008 Kenyan reconciliation "model-with strong regional
participation, committed leadership, prompt intervention, insistent dialogue and a more discreet if no
less vital role for the West").
116. See supra note I l1.
117. Nepal's controversial effort to legislatively establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
to address the decade-long violence between the former royal govemment and communist insurgents
has been sharply criticized for, among other things, its failure to embrace international human rights
standards. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NEPAL: RECONCILIATION DOES NOT MEAN IMPUNITY: A
MEMORANDUM ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION BILL (2007), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA3 1/006/2007/en/dom-ASA310062007en.pdf.
118. Thirty years after the Pol Pot "Killing Fields," Cambodia's reconciliation project emerging
out of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement appears to be mired in confusion and political maneuvering. See
Vannath Chea, Reconciliation in Cambodia: Politics, Culture and Religion, in RECONCILIATION AFTER
VIOLENT CONFLICT 49-50 (David Bloomfield et al. eds., 2003), available at
http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation chap03cs-cambodia.pdf.
119. Indigenous groups are threatening lawsuits if government reparations are not forthcoming.
See Johnston, supra note 99.
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• 120insincere in its delayed implementation. Britain's apology for slavery
and colonialism has drawn rebukes from reparations proponents because it
-. 121
failed to embrace meaningful acts toward reconciliation. And the New
Zealand Waitangi Tribunal's aboriginal land claims awards have been
undercut by the Crown government's long delay in finally acknowledging
many awards for political reasons."'
Sometimes political instability undermines even well-intentioned and
soundly-organized reconciliation initiatives. In 2005, after considerable
debate, the new East Timor government established a truth and
reconciliation process, with an emphasis on social healing.123 One of its
path-breaking tenets was gender redress-to heal the wounds of sexual
violence the occupying Indonesian soldiers inflicted on East Timor124
women. The commission embarked on a remarkable program of
psychological healing 125  and economic support as a foundation for
rebuilding the nation as a democracy. But political instability 26 slowed, if
not scuttled, the healing process.
The reconciliation concept's elasticity and shifting political
underpinnings provide little firm guidance to even well-meaning
policymakers or political organizers. Its theological roots also make it
suspect to some concerned about tenets of organized religion. 127  Equally
120. See TRUTH HEALING RECONCILIATION, supra note 103. Some who suffered find the overall
efforts less than sincere, orchestrated by government for its own benefit, and lacking the kind of mutual
engagement necessary for genuine healing. Id. Following Canada, the Tasmanian government
committed to reconciliation, apologizing, and authorizing individual reparations payments to its stolen
generation of aboriginal children. Barbara McMahon, Tasmania to Pay 'Stolen Generation' of
Aborigines £2.2m in Reparations, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 23, 2008, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jan/23/australia.intemational. Yet, the social and economic
impacts of its promises are uncertain.
12 1. See Petre, Blair's Deep Sorrow for Slavery, supra note 104. See also Stanford, Rejlections on
a Global Reparations Conference, supra note 104, at 8 (describing a Pan-African movement for slavery
reparations from Britain and other European countries).
122. See Williams, supra note 97 (describing political process for government approval of
Tribunal awards).
123. See generally Galuh Wandita, Karen Campbell-Nelson, Manuela Leong Pereira, Learning to
Engender Reparations in Timor-Leste: Reaching Out to Female Victims, in WHAT HAPPENED TO THE
WOMEN?: GENDER AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 290 (Ruth Rubio-Marin ed.,
2006) [hereinafter Wandita, Campbell-Nelson and Pereira, Reaching Out to Female Victims].
124. One of the Commission's recommendations was that "at least 50% of resources in this
program shall be earmarked for female beneficiaries." Id. at 294-96, 308.
125. The Commission proposed the following:
[A] reparations program with five guiding principles-feasibility, accessibility, empowerment,
gender, and prioriti-zation [sic] based on need-with the aim to repair, as far as possible, the
damage to their [victims'] lives caused by the violations, through the delivery of social
services to vulnerable victims and symbolic and collective measures to acknowledge and
honor victims of past violations.
Id. at 308.
126. See Tim Johnston, East Timor Declares Emergency After Attack on Leaders, Feb. 12, 2008,
N.Y. TIMES, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/world/asia/12timor.html?scp=l&sq=
east%20timor/o2Oemergency&st-cse.
127. See DONALD W. SHRIVER JR., AN ETHIC FOR ENEMIES: FORGIVENESS IN POLITICS 58 (1995).
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important, the vagueness of the term reconciliation makes a commitment to
reconciliation susceptible to political mischief-that is, "reconciliation"
can serve as an insincere cover for indifference or continuing hostilities and
power grabs. Reconciliation policymakers, scholars, and advocates are
still searching for a clear, cogent framework for guiding and assessing
reconciliatory initiatives. Reconciliation is experiencing a mid-life crisis.
Yet, as developed in the following section, a reconciliation initiative
in certain settings can be of considerable social value as a sometimes
promising though difficult pathway to redress. What is needed, then, are
the analytical concepts and language to shape and later critique
reconciliation efforts, and indeed all redress initiatives, so participants and
observers can know what genuine social healing looks like and how to hold
accountable those who commit to it.
A simple question distills this inquiry: When are social healing efforts
productive for people, institutions and society, and when are they not?
Recent writings, particularly those by Professor Rebecca Tsosie, bring
.. 129
analytical rigor to the concept of reconciliation. Pablo de Greif, editor of
the Handbook of Reparations, identifies broad reparatory justice goals of
recognition, civic trust and social solidarity, and examines both the
psychological and social structural dimensions of healing. 3 ° Professor
Yamamoto in other works suggests coalescing multi-disciplinary
understandings and casting redress, and particularly reconciliation, into a
potentially workable framework of "Social Healing Through Justice." '
With this in mind, the next section summarizes and refines Social
Healing Through Justice. This framework identifies social healing as the
deeper aim of most redress efforts in established democracies. It posits that
group healing (and healing society itself) can only occur by engaging the
self-determined goals of those harmed in multi-layered efforts at achieving
transformative justice. 3 2  The focus is not singularly on group
psychological and spiritual health, though they are important. 133  It also
targets social structural transformation-that is, it must affect material
change in socioeconomic and political conditions. 34  This entails
128. See infra Section IV.
129. See generally Rebecca Tsosie, Going Back to Class? The Reemergence of Class in Critical
Race Theory Symposium: Essay: Engaging the Spirit of Racial Healing within Critical Race Theory:
An Exercise in Transformative Thought, I IMICH. J. RACE & L. 21 (2005) [hereinaftler Tsosie, Going
Back to Class?]. See also BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO AND CON, supra note 8.
130. See Pablo de Greif, Justice and Reparations, in HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 10,
at 451 (articulating goals for "massive reparations programs")
13 I. See Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, American Reparations Theory and Practice, supra note 12.
132. Seeid. at39.
133. See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 19, 79 (1998).
134. Id. See also Jonathan R. Cohen, Coping With Lasting Social Injustice, 13 WASH. & LEE J.
Civ. RTS. AND SOC. JUST. 259, 268-69 (2007) ("While the experience of pain is deeply personal, one of
its ultimate finctions is quite political").
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engagement by all sectors of society, including communities, public
organizations, businesses, and governments.
The Social Healing Through Justice framework also accounts for
geopolitical pressures that influence most redress initiatives."' It does this
by integrating now widely acknowledged international norms of reparatory
justice, particularly the principles of the United Nations "Basic Principles
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law" and the recently-
adopted "Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples."'' 3 6 Finally, it
accounts for political complexities, including the potential for governments
or dominant groups to co-opt or distort the process-what is described as
the "darkside of reparations," or mere attempts to achieve "cheap grace."'37
In short, this reframing of redress aims to deepen understandings of multi-
faceted reparatory justice, particularly in established democracies, and to
delineate an approach, in substance and process, to genuine social healing.
IV. REFRAMING REDRESS:
SOCIAL HEALING THROUGH JUSTICE
A. Limits of Lawsuits and Court Rulings
In the early 2000s, American reparations thinking focused on how to
win reparations for African Americans in court. 13  It aimed to fit
reparations claims for slavery and Jim Crow segregation into a narrow
135. See generally Richard Falk, International Law, and Global Justice: A New Frontier, in THE
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 10, at 478; Hung, supra note 7 (describing the role of
international criticism in moving the Japanese government to reluctant action on "comfort women"
demands for an apology and reparations); Kieran McEvoy & John Morison, Constitutional and
Institutional Dimension: Beyond the "Constitutional Movement": Law, Transition, and Peacemaking
in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 961, 961-62 (2003) ("internationalizing" difficult issues
guided the peacemaking process in Ireland and resulted in the Belfast Agreement, which in turn
prompted domestic constitutional reform).
136. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006) (initially adopted by
the Human Rights Commission and the Economic and Social Council in 2005 (to which the United
States was not a signatory), and adopted in 2006 by resolution of the General Assembly) [hereinafter
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation]; United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, AIRES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/drip.html [hereinafter Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples].
137. See Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 7, at 483 (describing the "darker side," or
risks, of reparations process through: (1) the narrow "legal framing of reparations," (2) the "dilemma of
reparations" (opening old wounds and backlash), (3) and the "ideology of reparations" (restrictively
defining who is reparations-worthy)).
138. See, e.g., In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006)
(consolidated class actions against private companies involved in American slave trade for unjust
enrichment); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1995) (pro se suit against United States for
economic, physical and psychological harms of slavery).
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framework-intentional torts such as assault and fraud and unjust
enrichment. 139  In doing so it generated both enthusiasm and heated
•• 140
opposition.
Tort law offered traditional legal language and recognizable claims.
But it also equated reparations with court-awarded monetary compensation
(payment of "the debt").14  This emphasis on money payments spurred
technical legal defenses from government and business lawyers, 42 drew
rebukes from conservative scholars, 143 and fostered skepticism from the
mainstream American public.
1 44
The recent failure of reparations lawsuits in United States courts
highlighted the stark limits of this tort law money compensation model.
45
One consequence of this failure has been a public perception that
reparations claims lack merit-that there is no "right" to reparations. 146 Yet
stark inequalities in every facet of African American life persist and are
generally traceable to slavery and segregation. 1' As Professor Mari
Matsuda explains, the failure of reparations claims in traditional tort law
does not mean that the claims lack merit as group-based rights. 48 The tort
139. Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery and the Tort Law Analogy, 24
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 103-04, 120, 126 (2004) [hereinafter Brophy, Reparations Talk]
(discussing the validity and limited effectiveness of "social tort" claims along with unjust enrichment).
140. See, e.g., Peter Flaherty & John Carlisle, Nat 'I Legal & Policy Ctr., The Case Against Slave
Reparations (2004), available at http://www.nlpc.org/pdfs/FinalNLPCReparations.pdf (arguing
against slave reparations as a shakedown of the American people via the courts); David Horowitz, Ten
Reasons Why Reparations for Blacks is a Bad Idea for Blacks-and Racist Too, FRONTPAGE MAGAZINE,
Jan. 3, 2001, available at http://www.frontpagemag.con/Arlicles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=1153; John
WcWorter, Against Reparations, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?: SLAVERY AND THE RAGING DEBATE ON
REPARATIONS 180 (Raymond Winbush ed., 2003).
141. See RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (2001) (arguing
reparations are owed as a moral and legal obligation).
142. Technical objections include: (a) the statute of limitations; (b) the absence of directly harmed
individuals; (c) the absence of their perpetrators; (d) the lack of direct causation; (e) the ambiguity
behind compensation; and (f) sovereign immunity. Matsuda, supra note 7, at 373-80.
143. See, e.g., Armstrong Williams, Presumed Victims in Against Reparations, in SHOULD
AMERICA PAY? SLAVERY AND THE RAGING DEBATE ON REPARATIONS 180 (Raymond A. Winbush ed.,
2003).
144. See, e.g., Shelby Steele, Or A Childish Illusion of Justice?: Reparations Enshrine Victimhood,
Dishonoring Our Ancestors, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 2001, at 23.
145. See Brophy, Reparations Talk, supra note 139, at 103-04, 120, 126.
146. See Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 7, at 487-88 (Some argue that "there is no
need for additional reparations" because "existing civil rights laws already afford individuals equal
opportunity").
147. See Russell Sage Foundation, Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality,
http://www.russellsage.org/programs/recent/inequality (last visited Oct. 6, 2009); Jewel Crawford et al.,
Reparations for Health Care for African Americans: Repairing the Damage from the Legacy of Slavery,
in SHOULD AMERICA PAY? SLAVERY AND THE RAGING DEBATE ON REPARATIONS 251, 270-71
(Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003); SHERILYN A. IFILL. ON THE COURTHOUSE LAW: CONFRONTING THE
LEGACY OF LYNCHING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 171 (2007) (describing the need to create a
"new community" out of one "plagued by division"); MARLON RIGGS, ETHNIC NOTIONS (1986)
(illustrating the cultural stereotypes of African Americans from the slavery through post-Civil Rights
eras).
148. Matsuda, supra note 7, at 374, 381.
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law model, with its emphasis on direct causation, is designed for situations
such as a simple car accident lawsuit between two drivers involving only
money damages. It does not account for systemic group-based harms over
generations. 149 It also "misses the repairing of bodies, minds and spirits"
of individuals and communities.5  Moreover, lawsuits for monetary
compensation elicit tepid public support at best, since they appear to be
little more than one group paying another for something that happened long
ago.'5 ' Indeed, scholars opposing reparations cast reparations in that
narrow fashion"--only as voluntarily paid monetary compensation to
specific victims-and then find few if any injustices worthy of present-day
reparations.
53
In response, a new generation of reparations thinking still values
aspects of the legal process. It considers the legal process important as a
forum for altering public consciousness. 54 It moves away, however, from
the litigation-compensation model.'55 It focuses instead on ways to "repair"
the deep harms to society (divisions, guilt, shame, lack of moral standing)r. • •. 56
by healing the continuing wounds of injustice.
B. Social Healing
This is a significant shift in American thinking about redress.'57 It
reflects recognition of the critical importance of reshaping the public's
understanding of reparatory efforts as something more than monetary
149. See generally Verdun, supra note 20 (describing limitation of legal claims for reparations).
150. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 156.
15 1. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical
Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2003).
152. Id. at 690-93. But see BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO AND CON, supra note 8 (critiquing
limitations of conservative theorists' arguments against reparations).
153. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 151, at 745-46. According to Posner and Vermeule,
reparations "schemes" are limited to initiatives that: 1) involve an identified victim harmed by an
identified perpetrator; 2) look backward, focusing on compensation for past injuries, which precludes
claimants from seeking forward-looking, preventative relief; and 3) are voluntary; there is no legal
compulsion to pay the money. Id.
Prof. Brophy criticizes the "ideological underpinnings of [Posner and Vermeule's] framework: a
skewed ahistorical view of reparations that amounts to a pre-determined indictment of all reparations
claims." Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811, 817, 820-23 (2006). "What
looks at first blush like a moderate attempt to frame the issues becomes-through narrowly defining
reparations, as well as through narrow construction of the connection between wrongdoers and
payers-an article that inappropriately undermines reparations claims." Id. at 813-14.
154. See Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, American Reparations Theory and Practice, supra note 12,
at 56 ("[R]esearch on legal consciousness suggests that 'over time, international law norms may alter
what both governmental actors and larger populations view as 'right,' 'natural,' 'just,' or 'in their
interest.' Even unsuccessful litigation of redress claims can help generate new understandings of
history (recognition), sources of group harm (responsibility), and remedy (reconstruction)").
155. Id. at 31 (describing a fourth generation of reparations theory that embraces "repair" as a
central tenet).
156. Id.
157. BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO AND CON, supra note 8 (identifying the recent scholarly
movement toward a "repair" theory of reparations).
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compensation. For injured communities, it means moving policymakers
and the general public toward comprehensively repairing (1) the continuing
multi-faceted damage to those communities and (2) the societal damage
generated by mistrust, ill-will and a failure of democracy. All sides must
realize that mutual commitment is needed to generate productive relations
through acts of justice and that the joint effort, though onerous, is worth the
investment.'
5 8
The Social Healing Through Justice framework targets scholars,
government policymakers, and justice advocates engaged in reparatory
initiatives. 59 It is both theoretical (emerging at the intersection of several
scholarly disciplines), and practical (addressing what might be strategically
deployed in real life justice struggles).16  Its purpose is to enable interested
groups and governments both to guide and to assess their present-day
efforts toward the kind of transformative justice that promotes social
healing.
Aspects of prophetic theology, social psychology, sociolegal studies,
political theory (peace studies), economics, and indigenous healing
158. See Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, American Reparations Theory and Practice, supra note 12,
at 41.
159. Established democracies are those marked by democratic governance and a commitment to
civil and human rights. Governmental abuses of power and systemic subordination of vulnerable
groups expose those democracies to legal and moral claims for redress-for the society to be held
accountable according to its commitments. Countries transitioning from repressive regimes to
democracies are differently situated in terms of repairing the damage of past regimes. See Arturo
Carrillo, Justice in Context: The Relevance of Inter-American Human Rights Law and Practice to
Repairing the Past, in HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 10, at 504 (defining transitional justice
as the, "conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal
responses to confront the wrongdoing of repressive predecessor regimes"). Reparations programs are
often linked to criminal prosecutions of prior leaders for mass violence in response to public demands
for retribution and to reinstate the "rule of law." Id., at 505 (describing the sometimes "problematic"
pursuit of criminal accountability in transitioning countries). In this setting, "healing" approaches
aimed primarily at establishing new productive relationships between aggressors and victims will likely
be unproductive. Id.
160. See infra Section III.C. The proffered framework is one approach to addressing the social
problem of persisting damage from social injustice. Conceptually, the approach is situated between the
poles described by Martha Minow as "vengeance" (retribution) and "forgiveness" (acceptance). See
MINOW, supra note 133. It seeks to integrate disciplinary insights into the healing of individuals with
the insights into the repair of damaged communities and social groups. See generally Cohen, Coping
with Lasting Social Injustice, supra note 134 (delineating approaches to "coping" with the
psychological harms of social structural subordination). There are other insightful approaches. See,
e.g., ELIZAR BARKAN, COMMODIFYING APOLOGIES (2001); Joseph V. Montville, The Healing Function
in Political Conflict Resolution, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE: INTEGRATION AND
APPLICATION 112 (Dennis J.D. Sandole & Hugo van der Merwe eds., 1993); JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN,
TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE-FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL
TERROR (1992); SHRIVER, supra note 127. The Social Healing Through Justice framework draws from
these and other multidisciplinary works to provide an encompassing approach to reparatory justice
initiatives. It does so not to prescribe justice in specific situations but rather to provide participants and
observers with points of inquiry for guiding and critiquing serious reparatory initiatives. For an
elaboration of the conceptual underpinnings and particulars of the framework, earlier termed interracial
justice, see YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 173.
ASIAN AMERICAN LA WJOURNAL [Volume 16:5
practices coalesce with liberal legal theory's notions of equality and
fairness into common ideas about Social Healing Through Justice.' 61 That
kind of justice-a reparatory justice-encompasses reconstructing group
relationships and repairing lasting damage to group members and to society
itself.1
62
C. Reparatory Justice and the Four R's of Social Healing
Four commonalities emerge from diverse disciplines about the
dynamics of the kind of justice that fosters social healing. The first is the
embrace of the equivalent of the South African social idea of "ubuntu": all
are members of the polity, and injury to one harms the entire community;
therefore healing the injured is the responsibility of all. 163  The second is
that repair must occur in two realms simultaneously-the individual
(micro) and the institutional (macro). 164 Participation in the process must
be widespread, and all must see a benefit. 65 The third commonality is that
there must be material change in the socioeconomic conditions underlying
166
reconstructed group relationships otherwise, the dangers of "empty
apologies," "all words and no action," "false grace," or a "failure of
reconciliation."
6 7
161. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 153-72 (discussing in-depth these
disciplines' views of healing in light of law's embrace of notions of equality and due process). An
important aspect of economic theory, "economic justice," is also now addressing reparatory justice. See
EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE 1167, 1174 (2005) (addressing
"Reparations" and "Redress in the Global Political Economy"); EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P.
HARRIS, WHEN MARKETS FAIL-RACE AND ECONOMICS 489 (2006) (addressing "corrective struggles").
162. The framework thus has special resonance for some indigenous groups whose justice
struggles have been mischaracterized solely as claims for "ethnic pride" or "minority rights to
equality"-instead of as native peoples' comprehensive claims to restoration of ancestral lands and
resources, economic and political self-governance, and cultural protection. See generally Tsosie, Going
Back to Class?, supra note 129. See also generally PACIFIC INDIGENOUS DIALOGUE ON FAITH, PEACE,
RECONCILIATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE (Tui Atua Tamasese Taisi Efi et al. eds., 2007) (articulating
Pacific indigenous perspectives on healing and reconciliation); Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five
Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples' Claims in International and Comparative
Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 189 (2001).
163. See Desmond Tutu, Without Forgiveness There is No Future, Foreword to EXPLORING
FORGIVENESS, at xiii (Robert D. Enright & Joanna North eds., 1998).
164. Brandon Hamber, Narrowing the Micro and Macro: A Psychological Perspective on
Reparations in Societies in Transition, in HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 10, at 562, 563.
See also Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, American Reparations Theory and Practice, supra note 12, at 47-
48; YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 199-200. Mutual engagement can be
intensely local (classrooms, community halls, churches, temples, neighborhood newsletters) and also
deeply cultural, where ideas of injustice and redress are broadly shaped (newspapers, television,
internet, movies, scholarly publications). See IFILL, supra note 147, at 127 (describing the significance
of local as well as broader cultural forms of engagement in reparations and reconciliation debates).
165. Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, American Reparations Theory and Practice, supra note 12, at 47-
48.
166. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 8, at 54-55 (detailing the further effects of "material
change" between people and society).
167. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 194-95. See Cohen, Coping with
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The fourth commonality among the disciplines distills the other
commonalities into the "Four R's" of Social Healing Through Justice:
recognition, responsibility, reconstruction, and reparation. 16  These Four
R's offer points of inquiry to assist groups and governments first in shaping
a particular redress initiative and then in assessing whether the effort is on
the path toward genuine social healing--or whether it is heading toward
failure. They also provide justice advocates a strategic language for
coalescing self-determined goals into demands that resonate with broad
audiences.
This approach encompasses claims of legal right, but it most
effectively focuses on collaborative efforts among social groups or between
groups and governments that desire productive present-day relations but
whose interactions are marred by deep unresolved historic grievances. 69 It
does not address situations of continuing strong adversariness, for instance,
where criminal prosecutions are central, or where social alignments deprive
those injured of political support. 7°
In brief, the first R, recognition,17 1 addresses the psychological. It
looks at ways in which individuals, because of their group identity,
continue to suffer "pain, fear, shame and anger."'' 72  The recognition
inquiry also examines the historical and cultural. It scrutinizes the history
of the grievance and decodes stock stories embodying cultural stereotypes
that seemingly legitimize the injustice (for instance, the unassimilable
inherently disloyal Japanese American). 73  Finally, it examines the
institutional-the ways that organizational structures can embody
discriminatory policies that deny fair access to resources or promote
aggression. 174
Lasting Social Injustice, supra note 134, at 273 (a compounding "source of anger" among those
suffering injustice is the "absence of meaningful redress for the injuries").
168. INTERRACIAL JUSTICE distilled the multidisciplinary commonalities of Justice into the "Four
R's" framework. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 174-209. This framework
was recently updated and refined. See Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, American Reparations Theory and
Practice, supra note 12.
169. See generally THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 10.
170. Id.
171. For full discussion of recognition as part of social healing, see YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL
JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 175-85. See also Jonathan R. Cohen, The Immorality of Denial, 79 TUL. L.
REV. 903, 915 (2005) (describing the significance of recognition of the harms); Pablo de Greif, Justice
and Reparations, in HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 10, at 460 ("recognition is both a
condition and consequence of justice, which links reparations to recognition.").
172. Cohen, Coping with Lasting Social Injustice, supra note 134, at 253 (identifying the "pain,
fear, shame and anger" as typical harms of social subordination); M. Brinton Lykes and Marcie Mersky,
Reparations and Mental Health: Psychosocial Interventions Toward Healing, Human Agency, and
Rethreading Social Realities, in HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 10, at 589 (discussing
healing approaches to group-based psychological harm).
173. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 175-84.
174. See id. at 184 (explaining the recognition of Balkin leaders regarding the use of law and
media to promote and justify "use of violence for territorial conquest, the expulsion of 'other
peoples'."). For example, the East Timor Truth and Reconciliation Commission heard the horrific
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The next R, responsibility, entails an assessment of "power over"
others and an acceptance of responsibility of repairing the damage of
"disabling constraints" imposed on others through power abuses.175  The
presidential apology to World War II internees touched all these bases,
recognizing "the serious injustice ... done to Japanese Americans" and
accepting responsibility through words and money on behalf of all
Americans in order to "rectify the injustice and to uphold the rights of
individuals.' 76
The kind of justice that promotes social healing also necessarilyn . • '77
entails the third R-reconstruction. Reconstructive acts aim to build a
new productive relationship.77 They include apologies and forgiveness (if• 179
appropriate); a re-framing of the history of interactions; and, most
important, the reallocation of political and economic power. One aspect of
that reallocation means structuring everyone's "power to" participate fully
and freely rather than to enable one's "power over" others. "80 The power
testimony of women treated as culturally inferior and sexually violated for two decades by Indonesian
soldiers and recognized that the trauma, enduring pain, and economic deprivation required more than
truth-telling. Wandita, Campbell-Nelson and Pereira, Reaching Out to Female Victims, supra note 123,
at 284, 294-296 (describing the commission's proactive response to the East Timorian women's
testimony of atrocities). In light of the deep psychological and material harms, the women also required
immediate individual and group counseling, job training, artistic expression, social welfare, and
financial aid. Id.
175. "Responsibility," the second inquiry, asks "groups to assess group agency and accept
responsibility for ... wounds." YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 185 ("Only by
understanding the extent of a group's agency, constrained by context, can a rough evaluation be made
of the extension of its responsibility for harm to others"). For an in-depth discussion, see id
176. See YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG & Wu, RIGHTS AND REPARATION, supra note 7, at 481
(quoting President Bush's apology letter to former internees).
177. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 112, atl90-91. See generally GEIKO
MULLER-FAHRENHOLZ, THE ART OF FORGIVENESS: THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON HEALING AND
RECONCILIATION 28 (1997).
178. See YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE,supra note 112, at 190-91. See also HERMAN, supra
note 160, at 133-34 (1997) (one important harm of trauma is disconnection, and recovery depends in
part on building new productive relationships).
179. An apology that does not reveal changes in the apologizer's perspective is "self-serving in
self-renewing pursuit of the meaningless" and may be considered "cheap reconciliation." Ann Calhoun,
A World of Empty Apologies, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, July 24, 1995, at A6. For instance, theologians
characterized the Catholic Church's support of white apartheid and attempts to stop black opposition in
South Africa as "cheap reconciliation." See YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 112, at
161-162. Cheap grace perpetrates the wounds of injustice. See generally DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, THE
COST OF DISCIPLESHIP (1984).
180. Reconstruction of the political relationship to prevent recurrence of the underlying courses of
the harm is essential. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 195-96 (describing the
difference between "power over" (dominance) and "power to" (parity in participation) in restructured
relationships). See also Bernadette Atuanene, From Reparations to Restoration: Moving Beyond
Restoring Property Rights to Restoring Political and Economic Visibility, 60 SMU L. REV. 1419
(2007); Cohen, Coping with Lasting Social Injustice, supra note 134, at 279 (defining redress
achievement as "power to" rather than power over). For native peoples, "reconstruction" includes acts
that remake social and economic institutions to foster indigenous self-determination. As Jacqueline
Johnson Pata of the National Congress of American Indians aptly observes, the U.S. Senate's recent
apology to Native Americans and Native Alaskans is a symbolic first step-but only a first step-towards
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restructuring also aims to remake institutions to assure non-repetition of the
underlying abuses through "legislative or other reforms affecting the state's
social, legal or political institutions and policies."'
The fourth R, reparations, encompasses much more than money.
Reparations may include the restoration of property, rebuilding of culture,
economic development, and medical, legal, or educational and financial
support for individuals and communities in need. 82  The Handbook of
Reparations suggests that reparations cover restitution, rehabilitation, and
monetary payments. 83 Public education can also be an integral component
of reparations, as demonstrated by Japanese American redress, in the form
of memorials, school curricula, media presentations, or scholarly
publications.8 4 Public education serves to commemorate, to impart lessons
learned, and to generate a new justice narrative about a democracy's
commitment to civil and human rights.
The request for reparations by the East Timorian mother, raped
repeatedly by soldiers during the Indonesian occupation, coalesces these
many reparatory forms. She sought payment from the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission for her children's education. "I ask for help,"
she said, to change our lives and to "put my children through school. I was
used like a horse by the Indonesian soldiers who took me in turns and made
me bear many children. But now I no longer have the strength to push my
children towards a better future. Education is what they need."' 85
Policymakers, groups, and the general populace collectively need to
fully engage all four of these R's to heal social wounds. Otherwise, even
the most sincere healing efforts will likely be experienced as incomplete,
insufficient, and ultimately a failure. There is a substantial risk that
uncoordinated piecemeal actions, even when well-intentioned, will have
restructuring institutions in order to discharge the government's responsibility for the "horrendous
actions and a systematic government effort to obliterate Native Americans." Camire, Apologies for
Past Injustices Seen as First Step, supra note 86, at A5. See also Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting
Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2000).
181. See Carrillo, supra note 159, at 526-527 (the "first duty of the infringing state is to put an end
to the illicit act, if it persists, and then to guarantee that it will not reoccur").
182. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 208.
183. Restitution "normally entails the restoration of the victim's liberty, legal rights and social
status" but may also include "recovery of a lost residence, employment or property." Carrillo, supra
note 159, at 512 (describing the concept of restitution). Rehabilitation focuses on measures for healing
"psychological or physical harm," including "medical, legal and social services." Id. Money payments
compensate for "material losses" or "moral harm." Id. See also Saito, Remedies for Massive Wrongs,
supra note 7, at 281 (stressing the importance of judicial declarations and awards of monetary
compensation).
184. The 1988 Civil Liberties Public Education Fund, discussed supra Section 11, emphasized
storytelling and the reparatory dimensions of public education. The Commission administering the
Fund authorized school curricula, documentary films, fine arts displays, plays, and scholarly research.
See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
185. Wandita, Campbell-Nelson and Pereira, Reaching Out to Female Victims, supra note 123, at
284, 307 (quoting an interview with "AG" of Afaloicai in E. Timor (Sept. 18, 2003)).
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only limited salutary impact in light of the full range of harms.
Thus for African Americans struggling with poverty and community
disengagement, an apology for slavery and Jim Crow alone is not
enough.) 6 For the pastor of the Native Hawaiian church that had received
an apology from the Asian American churches and a $28,000 reparations
payment from the United Church of Christ for the roles these institutions
played in oppressing Hawaiian people after the overthrow of the Hawaiian
nation-the apology and payment were important steps forward. But true
healing would await further actions by the Church and by governmentT. •• 87
demonstrating fundamental change in dealings with Native Hawaiians.
D. Human Rights Norms Shaping Reconstruction and Reparations
Indeed, for indigenous Hawaiians and other long-subordinated groups,
the harms are "comprehensive," encompassing resources, culture, and
governance; "sustained" over generations; and "systemwide," implicating
national and local governments, businesses, and citizens. 88 A refined
Social Healing Through Justice framework suggests that in these situations,
a reparatory program of reconstruction and reparation must generate
change that is comprehensive, sustained, and systemwide in order to foster
the kind of justice that heals. It also suggests that the legitimacy of a
democracy professedly committed to civil and human rights is in part
dependent upon how it reconstructs relationships and repairs persisting
damage.
Global reconciliation initiatives informed by recently adopted human
rights norms are refashioning what constitutes systemic injustice'" and,
186. See generally RoY L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK
REPARATIONS (2004); BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO AND CON, supra note 8, at 7; Roy L. Brooks, The
Slave Redress Cases, 27 N.C. CENT. L.J. 130 (2005); Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, supra note
153, at 811; Eric J. Miller, Reconceiving Reparations: Multiple Strategies in the Reparations Debate,
24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 45 (2004); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Current Reparations Debate, 36
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1051 (2003).
187. See YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 212 (describing a pastor's
response to the apology and reparations by the Hawai'i Conference of the United Church of Christ and
Asian American churches).
188. See infra Section IV.D (discussing reparatory justice for colonized indigenous peoples).
189. Civil rights law in the United States has been increasingly influenced by human rights norms.
For "nearly half a century," the U.S. Supreme Court "has consistently referred to foreign and
international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of decency." Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 604 (2005). In particular, Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter have
"appear[ed] quite open to the idea of international human rights law influencing constitutional
interpretation of 'cruel and unusual punishment' [in Roper v. Simmons], and likely in regard to other
'expansive language' in the Constitution." Stanley A. Halpin, Looking Over a Crowdand Picking Your
Friends: Civil Rights and the Debate Over the Influence of Foreign and International Human Rights
Law on the Interpretation of the US. Constitution, 30 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 18-19
(2006). See also, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (Justice Stevens cited Europe's
"overwhelming[] disapprov[al]" of the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders under the cruel and
unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
(Justice Kennedy cited a 1981 European Court of Human Rights case recognizing other nations'
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therefore, what is needed for comprehensive and sustained reconstruction
and reparation. International human rights instruments guarantee victims
of crimes of injustice "an effective remedy." 190 Whether for slavery,
torture, mass rape, or serious racial discrimination, remedies extend well
beyond monetary compensation. As mentioned, they encompass social
healing-"restitution" (returning), "rehabilitation" (rebuilding, repairing),
and prevention of repetition (restructuring).' 9' These remedies envision
public apologies, memorials, educational programs, new laws, and
reformed political institutions.'92
In 2006, the United Nations General Assembly embraced these broad
reparatory remedies in adopting the "Basic Principles and Guidelines on
the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law."' The Basic Principles and Guidelines emphasize
protection of homosexuals' privacy and equal protection rights to declare Texas' sodomy law
unconstitutional); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
(1988)). Justices Kennedy and Breyer have also stated that for due process purposes the tribunals "must
be understood to incorporate at least the barest of those trial protections that have been recognized by
customary international law." Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (2006). See also generally
Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of the U.S. Supreme Court, 24
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 273 (2006). Justice Ginsburg has further recognized the importance of enforcing
human rights law against racial and other forms of discrimination by saying, "We are the losers if we
neglect what others can tell us about endeavors to eradicate bias against women, minorities, and other
disadvantaged groups. For irrational prejudice and rank discrimination are infectious in our world. In
this reality, as well as the determination to counter it, we all share." Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah
Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Right Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253,
282 (1999); see also Stephen Breyer, Supreme Court Justice, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 265, 265 (2003) (supporting Ginsburg).
190. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees an "effective remedy" for
any person whose human rights have been violated. See International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, art. 2(3), U.N. Doe. A/6316 (Mar
23, 1966).
191. See, e.g., Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 351, 354 (2008)
(rejecting a reparatory scheme for human rights violations that centers around compensation); Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in America, 38 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 279, 307 (2003) (arguing that money damages are not the best tailored relief for the harms
of slavery because they fail to facilitate the "broader goal" of developing "ways of crafting forward-
looking initiatives for racial reconciliation"); Linda M. Keller, Seeking Justice at the International
Criminal Court: Victim's Reparations, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 189, 194 (2007) (identifying a range of
available non-monetary remedies for human rights violations). See also generally Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation, G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 136.
192. For a description of various possible "effective remedies," see Oscar Schachter, The
Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic Law, in INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 325 (Louise Henkin ed., 1981); see also generally Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation, G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 136.
193. Specifically, victims of human rights violations, including the direct victim's immediate
family and dependants, have a right to "full and effective reparation, . . . restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, 'satisfaction' (in the form of public disclosure, public apology, restoration of dignity,
and public education) "and guarantees of non-repetition." Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right
to Remedy and Reparation, G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 136, 18.
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existing remedial principles of well-established instruments of international
law.1
94
Indigenous peoples' human rights norms also broadly shape present-
day understandings of reparatory justice. Like general human rights
instruments, the recently-adopted United Nations Declaration of Rights of
Indigenous Peoples embodies reparatory justice, calling for more than
monetary compensation.'95 The Declaration calls for affirmative acts to
repair long-term damage to indigenous peoples from the theft of lands,
destruction of culture and denial of self-governance. 196 The remedies must
be tailored to the harm. That is, when the injuries are long-term and
systemic, so must the response.197
From this idea emerges specific remedial norms-particularly self-
determination. 98 Because the systematic denial of self-determination is a
basic harm to indigenous peoples, 199 reparatory justice emphasizes self-
determination over economics, culture, and governance. 00 These remedial
norms-collectively connoting reconstruction and reparation-are framed
20 202
as rights to cultural integrity, 2°1 lands and resources, social welfare and
194. The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation reaffirm
reparatory principles expressly drawn from: "the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, . . . the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, . . . the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,. .. the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, . . . the Convention on the Rights of the Child,...
the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, . . . the American Convention on Human Rights,...
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" and other relevant
human rights instruments. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation,
G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 136, pmbl.
195. See infra notes 206, 209.
196. Id. See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note .136, arts. 8(2), 11(2)
States shall provide effective mechanisms for ... redress for ... [a]ny action which has the aim or
effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic
identities . . . . States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include
restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, intellectual,
religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of
their laws, traditions and customs.
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 101, at 341; Elena Cirkovic, Self-Determination and Indigenous
Peoples in International Law, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 375, 381 (2006/2007); S. James Anaya, The
Native Hawaiian People and International Human Rights Law: Toward a Remedy for Past and
Continuing Wrongs, 28 GA. L. REV. 309, 330-31(1994). See also Andrew Huff, Papers Presented: 2004
ILSA Fall Conference, Oct. 21-23, 2004 University of Colorado School of Law: Panel: Indigenous
Rights, Local Resources and International Law: Indigenous Land Rights and the New Self-
Determination, 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 295, 321 (2005) (describing indigenous self-
determination under the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples).
199. The harms of colonization to indigenous peoples are in some respects unique. Anaya, supra
note 198, at 342. Ethnic minorities have rights to non-discrimination, or equality. See ICCPR, Art. 27.
Indigenous people suffered from the exploitation of their natural resources, the appropriation of their
traditional lands, and the denial of their right to self-governance. See generally Anaya, supra note 198.
200. See infra notes 217-220.
201. Cultural integrity is "the ability of groups to maintain and freely develop their cultural
identities." Anaya, supra note 198, at 342. See also Rebecca Tsosie, The New Challenge to Native
Identity: An Essay on "Indigeneity" and "Whiteness", 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 55, 77-83 (2005)
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developmente° and self-government. 4 The norms shape social healing for
215indigenous peoples. Significantly, these norms apply more broadly to
shape reparatory justice for the group-based harms of systemic
subordination for other groups as well.
20 6
E. Linking Redress to Democratic Legitimacy
The problem with asserting human rights claims directly in courts is
that, generally, most courts refuse to enforce those claims. 2°7 Human rights
norms remain largely aspirational. Yet, despite the difficulty of achieving
favorable court judgments, strategically framing legal claims partly in
(discussing indigeneity and cultural rights). The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
recognizes indigenous peoples' right to practice and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs.
See, e.g., Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 136, arts. 12, 14, 15.
202. Indigenous human rights norms aim to restore indigenous peoples' special connection to land
and resources. See Anaya, supra note 198, at 352; Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination,
and the Seventh Generation, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 47, 87 (2008); Huff, supra note 198 , at 330;
Tsosie, The New Challenge to Native Identity, supra note 201, at 68-77. The Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples recognizes a broad indigenous peoples' right to their "distinctive spiritual
relationship" with traditional lands, water and resources. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, supra note 136, art. 25.
203. The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognizes that indigenous peoples have
"the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social conditions,
including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and retraining, housing,
sanitation, health and social security" and that "States shall take effective measures and, where
appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social
conditions." Id., art. 21. In addition, the U.N. Declaration on the Right to Development recognizes "an
inalienable human right by virtue of which every person and all peoples are entitled to participate in,
contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights
and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized." United Nations Declaration on the Right to
Development, A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/41/
a41rl28.htm.
204. Human rights embrace self-governance -the idea that "government is to function according to
the will of the people governed." Anaya, supra note 198, at 354. See also Tsosie, The New Challenge
to Native Identity, supra note 201, at 63-68 (discussing indigeneity and political rights).
205. One obvious way that the Declaration informs indigenous healing is its explicit recognition of
indigenous peoples' unique, collective, and spiritual relationship with traditional lands and waters. For
example, the Chthonic (indigenous) legal tradition inherently recognizes land as a part of indigenous
identity. See generally H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE
DIVERSITY IN LAW (2000).
206. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation, G.A. Res.
60/147, supra note 136. The Basic Principles and Guidelines recognize group-based claims to
reparation. "Contemporary forms of victimization ... may ... be directed against groups of persons
who are targeted collectively." Id. at pmbl. Victims include persons who "collectively suffered harm,
including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss, or substantial impairment of
their fundamental rights." Id. at 8. Additionally, the principles require that group victims be allowed
access to justice by presenting claims for reparation and receiving reparation. Id. at 13.
207. RICHARD B. LILLICH AND HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS OF
LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 502 (2006). See generally Jon M. Van Dyke, Reparations for the
Descendants of American Slaves Under International Law, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?: SLAVERY AND
THE RAGING DEBATE ON REPARATIONS 57, 58 (Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003); Halpin, supra note
189, at 4-12, 38 (describing the four human rights enforcement models and how they generally have
failed to secure human rights court judgments in the United States).
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human rights terms can be an effective Social Healing Through Justice
political strategy.2 O8
Although reparations claims rarely succeed in court, most politically
successful reparations or reconciliation movements have been inspired and
shaped at crucial points by litigation. 209 That litigation serves as a lightning
rod for recognition and responsibility and as a bully pulpit for community
organizing about the injustice and need for system-wide reconstruction and
210
reparation. Sociolegal research suggests that international human rights
claims widely-publicized through court challenges, in certain political
settings, alter over time what both government policymakers and the public
come to view as "'right,' 'natural,' 'just,' or 'in their interest.'" ' 21' This in
turn can help build public pressure to enable progressive leaders to press a
government politically to heal the wounds of injustice.
More specifically, political pressure for recognition of and acceptance
of responsibility for historic harms is increasingly linked to the legitimacy
of present-day democratic governance.212  Although social healing
initiatives differ, policymakers and justice advocates from established and
213
emerging democracies coalesce around a precept grounded in human
rights principles: redress for injuries of past injustice is foundational to
democratic legitimacy.
14
The Social Healing Through Justice framework's integration of
human rights norms highlights this linkage of redress to legitimacy.
Democratic legitimacy-or the perception of a government's validity in
terms of democratic governance and its commitment to civil and human
rights215-is particularly important for the United States in light of the
216dramatic decline of American stature in international affairs. As one
208. See Yamamoto, Serrano & Rodriguez, American Racial Justice on Trial, supra note 7, at
1319.
209. See id. at 1322.
210. See id.
211. See Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV.
1265, 1269 (2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005)).
212. See HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 10 (describing successful international
reparations movements as a pan of democratic nation-building). See also Yamamoto, Kim & Holden,
American Reparations Theory and Practice, supra note 12, at 64 (assessing "reparations as integral to
democratic legitimacy").
213. See LEGACIES OF INJUSTICE, supra note 102, at 11.
214. See Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, American Reparations Theory and Practice, supra note 12,
at 69.
215. See Berman, supra note 211, at 1292 (describing how adhering to international human rights
norms can advance a government's long-term interests by "allowing the state to have legitimacy and a
certain morally persuasive voice in the eyes of other states.").
216. Departing United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan challenged the United States under
President Bush to stop behaving like a rogue nation and act cooperatively and abide by human rights.
See Reynolds Holding, A Law of Convenience, TIME, Mar. 5, 2007, at 48 (reporting on Annan's
departing remarks). See generally ERIC ALTERMAN & ERIC GREEN, THE BOOK ON BUSH: How
GEORGE W. (MIS)LEADS AMERICA (2004); DAVID CORN, THE LIES OF GEORGE W. BUSH: MASTERING
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commentator aptly observes, while the "ideal of the United States as
beacon of justice, democracy, freedom and human rights still garners
grudging respect abroad," America's "moral standing [as a democracy] in
the world has precipitously declined since 2001."2I7
This international loss of moral authority as a democracy is implicated
in a Social Healing Through Justice approach to redress. It reveals the self-
interest of the United States in redressing American injustices. For
instance, historically, harsh international criticism of America's racist Jim
Crow democracy during the Cold War compelled United States political
leaders to shift positions and argue for ending the separate-but-equal
doctrine in Brown v. Board of Education.'"' President Reagan reversed his
prior opposition to Japanese American redress in 1988 when America
needed to bolster its stature as a democracy during its end-stage fight
against the "iron curtain."" 9 For modem redress advocates, this kind of
American self-interest in redress lies at the heart of Derrick Bell's theory of
interest-convergence-that a dominant power will countenance civil and
human rights advances only when those gains simultaneously serve its
220larger political interests.
The near-unilateral prosecution of the Iraq war by the United States,
its charged human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and
secret detention centers, and its post-9/1 1 domestic civil liberties violations,
has tarnished its reputation worldwide. 2 1 And because it also has refused
to engage recent national redress efforts, including reparations for African
222 • 223Americans, "' land reclamation for Native Americans, and self-
THE POLITICS OF DECEPTION (2003); PAUL WALDMAN, FRAUD: THE STRATEGY BEHIND THE BUSH
LIES AND WHY THE MEDIA DIDN'T TELL YOU (2004).
217. Julia E. Sweig, Anti-Americanism - It's Not All Bush's Fault, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2006/aug/l 5/opinion/oe-sweig i5.
218. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL
RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000).
219. See Yamamoto, Social Meanings of Redress, supra note 1, at 231 (describing the importance
to American policymakers of perceptions of American commitment to civil and human rights at the
moment the United States sought to promote democracy and end the cold war with the Soviet Union).
220. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (describing a convergence of interests of the
dominant group and the subordinate group as a pre-condition to civil rights and progress under law).
22 1. See Natsu Taylor Saito, For "Our" Security: Who is an "American " and what is Protected
by Enhanced law Enforcement and intelligence Powers? 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 23, 40 (2004); Eric K.
Yamamoto, White(House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to Hold the President
Accountablefor National Security Abuses, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285 (2008).
222. Yamamoto, Serrano, & Rodriguez, African American Reparations, supra note 7, at 1291
(describing the international uproar at the Bush Administration's refusal to participate in the Durban
South Africa International Conference on Racism because of the Conference's consideration of
reparations for African Americans).
223. See WARD CHURCHILL, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND: NORTH AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO
GENOCIDE, ECOCIDE AND COLONIZATION (1999); Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural
Justice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (2000).
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determination for Native Hawaiians,224 the United States has faced strong
criticism about its legitimacy as a democracy that is genuinely committed
225to civil and human rights.
To reclaim legitimacy, an established democracy like the United
States needs to demonstrate fealty to internationally respected precepts of
democratic governance. In particular, the United States must heal the
continuing wounds of injustice inflicted on its own people.226 Indeed, as
revealed through the Japan-Ainu reparatory efforts discussed later, a
democracy struggling for moral high ground under the glare of
international criticism sometimes responds by advancing a national social
healing initiative.
With roots in Japanese American redress and multidisciplinary
insights into social group healing, deepened by human rights notions of
reparatory justice, the Social Healing Through Justice framework is next
employed to critique, and possibly guide, two ongoing redress initiatives.
The first is the United States' commitment to reconcile with Native
Hawaiians. The second is Japan's efforts to repair the persisting harms to
indigenous Ainu. We employ the Four R's to illuminate the salutary
aspects and shortfalls of these halting yet recently rejuvenated initiatives
and to highlight the strategic linkage of social healing initiatives to
democratic legitimacy.
V. THE UNITED STATES' COMMITMENT TO RECONCILE
WITH NATIVE HAWAIIANS
When English Captain James Cook initiated Western contact with
Hawai'i in 1778 and introduced foreign diseases, Native Hawaiians
numbered around 800,000.117 By the late 1880s, the indigenous population
228plummeted to 40,000. Westerners also politically undermined the
224. See infra Section IV (addressing Native Hawaiian reconciliation).
225. Yamamoto, Serrano, & Rodriguez, African American Reparations, supra note 7, at 1291
226. Id. at 1294.
227. See LILIKALA KAME'ELEIHIWA, NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES: PEHEA LA E PONO
At? 20 (1992).
228. See id Devastation "came not only through infection and disease, but through racial and
legal discourse that crippled the will, confidence, and trust of the K~naka Maoli as surely as leprosy and
smallpox claimed their limbs and lives." JONATHAN KAY KAMAKAWIWO'OLE OSORIO, DISMEMBERING
LAHUI: A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN NATION TO 1887 3 (2002).
Christian missionaries arrived in 1820 and encouraged Chieftess Ka'ahumanu to reject
Hawaiian gods and centuries-old "kapu" (moral-legal) system. See KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 227,
at 166, 388. The missionaries endeavored to civilize the "heathen savages," the "wretched creatures."
MARY KAWENA PUKUI, E.W. HAERTIG, M.D., & CATHERINE A. LEE, NANA I KE KUMU (LOOK TO THE
SOURCE), VOLUME 11302 (1972). In 1848, the old, sophisticated order ofa communal subsistence land
tenure system was replaced by Western concepts of property ownership. See JON VAN DYKE, WHO
OWNS THE CROWN LANDS OF HAWAI'I? 1 (2008); WALDO E. MARTIN & PATRICIA SULLIVAN, CIVIL
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sovereign Hawaiian kingdom. The Hawaiian League, composed of haole
229(Caucasian) men, through threat of force, compelled King David
Kal~kaua to sign the Bayonet Constitution transferring much of his royal
authority to white American businessmen. 23
In 1893, the internationally recognized sovereign Hawaiian nation was
overthrown by the small group of American businessmen with the direct
backing of the U.S. military. 23I The quest for fertile plantation lands, tariff-
free U.S. markets, political power, and military control fueled the coup. 232
233Queen Lili'uokalani, who resisted, was imprisoned in her own palace.
American President Grover Cleveland objected to what he called the
"illegal" United States-aided overthrow, which he also characterized as an
"act of war., 234  Out of his "desire to aid in the restoration of the status
existing before the lawless landing of the United States forces at
Honolulu, 2 35 he initiated support for Hawaiian sovereignty and the re-
establishment of the Hawaiian nation by withdrawing a pending treaty for
236
annexation.
But with the Pearl Harbor military base and vast acreage of sugar cane
lands at stake, the next president, William McKinley, with strong American
business support, pushed Congress to annex Hawai'i by joint resolution237
238(a defective means of annexation). Despite formal protest by the former
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 333 (2000). The Mahele required the maka'5inana, or commoners, to
make claims for land with the Land Commission. See JON VAN DYKE, WHO OWNS THE CROWN LANDS
OF HAWAI'I? 1, 46 (2008). Because of legal restrictions, cost and foreignness of the idea of private
property, the M~hele failed to make commoners landowners. Instead, American missionaries and
businessman became large land holders. KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 227, at 296.
229. See OSORIO, supra note 228, at 193.
230. See VAN DYKE, supra note 228, at 123. This "allowed the whites political control without
requiring that they swear allegiance to the king." See OSORIO, supra note 228, at 197.
231. See III RALPH KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, 587-88 (1967). By 1893, the
population declined to 40,000. ld
232. The discussion of Hawaiian history and reconciliation here is drawn substantially from an
essay by Ashley Kaiao Obrey, published in the Ka He'e Summer 2007 newsletter of the Center for
Excellence in Native Hawaiian Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i. See
generally Broken Promise? A Brief Update on the U.S. Role in Native Hawaiian Reconciliation since
the 1993 Apology, KA HE'E (Center for Excellence in Native Hawaiian Law, William S. Richardson
School of Law, University of Hawai'i), Aug. 2007, available at
http://www2.hawaii.edu/-nhlawctr/article3-6.htm.
233. See LILI'UOKALANI, HAWAI'I'S STORY BY HAWAI'I'S QUEEN 268-69 (1964).
234. President Grover Cleveland, Message to the Senate and House of Representatives at the
Executive Mansion in Washington (Dec. 18, 1893), available atihp://hawaii-nation.or_/cleveland.
html.
235. Id.
236. See id
237. See Melody K. MacKenzie, "Historical Background," in Native Hawaiian Rights Handbook
14 (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie ed., 1991); "Joint Resolution to Provide for Annexing the
Hawaiian Islands to the United States," 30 Stat. 750 (1898). See also TOM COFFMAN, NATION WITHIN:
THE STORY OF AMERICA'S ANNEXATION OF THE NATION OF HAWAI'I (1992).
238. "Proper" annexation involves a treaty and a vote of Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl.
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Queen and over twenty-one thousand Native Hawaiians-most of the adult
Hawaiian population-the United States imposed American political
governance over the islands and confiscated all Hawaiian government and
royal lands." 9 To justify their actions, American politicians and media
badly mischaracterized Hawaiians as uncivilized heathens in need of1 , 40
civilizing influences. What followed was the continued separation of
Native Hawaiians from the land, the suppression of Hawaiian culture, and
the dislocation of families. The United States later acknowledged this
"devasta[tion]" of indigenous Hawaiian life. 4'
One hundred years later, amidst a Hawaiian cultural renaissance and
intense political organizing for a return of sovereignty and homelands,242
and with support of religious leaders and a Democratic president, the
243United States finally acknowledged the harms of American colonization.
The extraordinary 1993 Congressional Apology Resolution apologized for
the role America played in the 1893 "illegal overthrow" of the Hawaiian
nation244 and committed the United States to reconciliation to repair the
resulting "devastation. 245
The Apology Resolution's commitment to redress reflected careful
attention to the Social Healing Through Justice framework's first and
second R's: (1) recognition of the physical, cultural and economic damage
239. See Report of L.A. Thurston on the Hawaiian Anti-Annexation petition, in Ki'a: The Hui
Aloha 'Aina Anti-Annexation Petitions, 1897-1898, at 820, available at http://libweb.hawaii.edu/
digicoll/annexation/petition/pet820.html.
240. See Sharon K. Horn & Eric K. Yamamoto, Collective Memory, History, and Social Justice, 47
UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1775-76 (2000)
241. See Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, Nov. 23, 1993.
Under the territorial government created by the Organic Act of 1900, Hawai'i Organic Act (1900), "the
remnants of Hawaiian land tenure, other traditional or customary institutions, and cultural practices,
including the use of the Hawaiian language, were suppressed." See HAUNANI KAY-TRASK, FROM A
NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAI'i 2-4 (1993); Anaya, supra note 198,
at 315, 335. Thus, Hawai'i's history "is a story of violence, in which that colonialism literally and
figuratively dismembered the I5hui (the people) from their traditions, their lands, and ultimately their
government. The mutilations were not physical only, but also psychological and spiritual." See
OSORIO, supra note 228, at 3.
242. See id
243. See Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, Nov. 23, 1993. In November 1993, one
hundred years after the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, President William Clinton signed the
Apology Resolution into law. See id.
244. Id. Specifically, Congress, "on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the illegal overthrow
of the Kingdom of Hawaii"
Acknowledges the historical significance of this event which resulted in the suppression of
the inherent sovereignty of the Native Hawaiian people [and] apologizes to Native Hawaiians
... for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893 with the participation of
agents and citizens of the United States, and the deprivation of the rights of Native Hawaiians
to self-determination.
Id (emphasis added).
245. Id ("[Congress] expresses its commitment to acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow
of the Kingdom of Hawaii, in order to provide a proper foundation for reconciliation between the
United States and the Native Hawaiian people.").
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of America's colonization of Native Hawaiians;246 and (2) acceptance of
247
responsibility by committing to a process of reconciliation.
The Apology Resolution recognized that the Hawai'i state legislature
had already expressed a firm commitment to reconcile with Native
Hawaiians for misappropriating and mismanaging Hawaiian lands held in
trust.248  And the Resolution's inclusion of the United Church of Christ
signaled the national Church's acceptance of responsibility for its
missionary role in the overthrow (with a $1.5 million payment and an
apology).249
In 1999, President Clinton's administration further committed the
United States to reconciliation, ° sending the Department of Interior and
Department of Justice to Hawai'i to hear testimony from hundreds of
Native Hawaiians from all islands about what federal and state actions were
needed next.25 1 The Departments' Joint Reconciliation Report
recommended that the government engage with Native Hawaiians and
undertake affirmative acts to heal the persisting wounds of American
injustice. Invoking language of moral responsibility, and drawing on the
human rights principle of self-determination, the Report recommended
reconstructing the relationship between indigenous Hawaiians and the
246. See id ("Whereas, the long-range economic and social changes in Hawaii over the Nineteenth
and early Twentieth Centuries have been devastating to the population and to the health and well-being
of the Hawaiian people").
247. Through the Resolution, Congress "express[ed] its commitment ... to provide a proper
foundation for reconciliation between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people" and
"recognize[ed] and commends efforts of reconciliation initiated by the State of Hawaii and the United
Church of Christ with Native Hawaiians." See id.
248. See A Broken Trust: The Hawaiian Homelands Program: Seventy Years of Failure of the
Federal and State Governments to Protect the Civil Rights of Native Hawaiians, Hawai'i Advisory
Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights 21 (Dec. 1991). See also Rose Cuison
Villazor, Blood Quantum Land Laws and the Race Versus Political Identity Dilemma, 96 CAL. L. REV.
801 (2008).
249. See YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 211, 215. The Asian American
United Church of Christ churches in Hawai'i , comprised of former immigrants and descendents who
had struggled against haole discrimination, also confessed "complicity" in the subordination of
Hawai'i's indigenous people for a century following the overthrow. See id. Those Asian American
churches helped move the UCC Hawai'i Conference's 120 multiracial churches to embark in the mid-
1990s on a comprehensive, four-year reconciliation initiative encompassing apologies, healing
ceremonies, payments of monetary reparations, land transfers and the establishment of a Native
Hawaiian community foundation. See id
250. See Department of the Interior and the Department of Justice, Report on the Reconciliation
Process Between the Federal Government and Native Hawaiians: From Mauka to Makai: The River of
Justice Must Flow Freely (Draft Report), (Aug. 23, 2000), available at
http://www.iiirm.org/hawaiian-consultation/workshop%20materials/river justice.pdf [hereinafter Joint
Reconciliation Report].
251. See id. According to John Berry (Department of the Interior) and Mark Van Norman (Office
of Tribal Justice, for the Department of Justice), the Apology was the "first step in the healing
process." See id. In 1999, representatives of each Department consulted the Native Hawaiian
communities on seven islands. On the main island of Oahu, several hundreds testified and 265
submitted written statements on topics ranging from sovereignty to community and economic
development to health, education and housing. See id.
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United States by legislatively recognizing Native Hawaiian semi-
independence (similar to the status of Native Americans)."' It also
highlighted the need for reparatory government programs to repair the
. .. 253
cultural and economic harms to Native Hawanans.
The Report concluded that the "time has come for the United States
Government and Native Hawaiians to join hands to repair the past and
build a better future, based upon righteousness and justice, and guided by
the spirit of healing and aloha to fulfill the goal of reconciliation."
254
In both tone and content, the Report presaged the broad vision of
reparatory justice of the Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples255
repairing persisting damage through a combination of government,
citizenry and native community support for indigenous culture and forms
of knowledge, 216 for the return of homelands, and for native control217 over
social welfare, economic development, and political institutions.258
Congress enacted reparatory legislation, beginning in the late 1980s,
that accelerated after the Resolution through the early 2000s. It returned
the island of Kaho'olawe to Native Hawaiians, which the government had
taken and long used for military bombing practice.259  It also reauthorized
252. See id.
253. See id. The Report supported existing reparatory legislation addressing Native Hawaiians'
economic deprivation, low educational attainment, poor health status, substandard housing, and social
dislocation, including the Native Hawaiian Health Care Act, the pending Hawaiian Health Care
Improvement Act, Native Hawaiian Healthcare Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 11701, the Native Hawaiian
Education Act, Native Hawaiian Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7902 (1988), and various Native Hawaiian
Housing programs. See Joint Reconciliation Report, supra note 250, at 2.
254. Id.
255. See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 136 ("Recognizing the
urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous peoples which derive from their
political, economic and social structures and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and
philosophies, especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources.").
256. See id; Ko Hasegawa, Polymorphic Integration of the Ainu 2 (2008) (on file with author).
Although indigenous struggles are usually localized, "they have been globalised in the channels of
international political organizations that have amplified their voices." See Richard Rice, Ainu
Submergence and Emergence: Human Rights Discourse and the Expression of Ethnicity in Modern
Japan, Southeast Review of Asian Studies 3 (2006, ed. 2008), available at
http://www.uky.edu/Centers/Asia/SECAAS/Seras/2006/Rice.doc (citing Jonathan Friedman,
Indigenous Struggles and the Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie, PERPLEXITIES OF IDENTIFICATION:
ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES IN CULTURAL DIFFERENTIATION AND THE USE OF RESOURCES 161
(2000)); Marlene Brant Castellano, Updating Aboriginal Traditions of Knowledge, INDIGENOUS
KNOWLEDGES IN GLOBAL CONTEXTS: MULTIPLE READINGS OF OUR WORLD 33 (Georg Jerry Sefa Dei,
Budd L. Hall, & Dorothy Goldin Rosenberg eds., 2000).
257. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 136. The Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognizes that indigenous people have the right to self-determination that
gives them the right to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social,
and cultural development." Id.
258. According to Professor Haunani Kay-Trask, the colonizer possesses the power to dictate the
terms of any agreements-including reconciliatory arrangements. It can choose whether it
acknowledges the aggrieved parties' complaints and will only act in its own self-interest during
negotiations. See KAY-TRASK, supra note 241, at 104.
259. HAW. REV. STAT. § 6K (2007). See also VAN DYKE, supra note 228, at 269.
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260the Native Hawaiian Health Care Act, passed the Native Hawaiian
Education Act 2 61 and established and funded various Native Hawaiian
262Housing programs. The State of Hawai'i also stepped up its promotion
of Hawaiian language in public schools and accelerated development of
Hawaiian Homelands.263
But then reconciliation efforts stalled. The United States expanded
military operations on vast tracks of former Hawaiian government and
royal lands. 64  Following the lead of national think tanks,265 the Bush
administration opposed federal and state Native Hawaiian programs as
unlawful "racial preferences. 266  A conservative U.S. Supreme Court
partially echoed that sentiment in Rice v. Cayetano in invalidating a Native
Hawaiian-only voting requirement for trustees of the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs (OHA).267  OHA had been created by state constitutional
amendment to promote Native Hawaiian self-determination and serve as a
260. Native Hawaiian Healthcare Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 11701. In 2007, Congress budgeted
nearly $14 million for Native Hawaiian health care under pending legislation known as the Native
Hawaiian Health Care Improvement Act, which was introduced in early 2005. Native Hawaiian Health
Care Improvement Reauthorization Act of 2005, S.215 [10 9 1h], introduced January 31, 2005.
261. Native Hawaiian Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7902 (1988).
262. Dennis Camire, House OKs Hawaiian housing, HonoluluAdvertiser.com (March 29, 2007),
available at http://www.house.gov/abercrombie/pdf/hawaiihousing_032907.pdf
263. See generally Kauanoe Kamana and William H. Wilson, Hawaiian Language Programs, in
STABILIZING INDIGENOUS LANGUAGES (Gina Cantoni ed., 1996); Gordon Y.K. Pang, More are
realizing homestead dreams, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Feb. II, 2007, available at
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2007/Feb/l I/In/FP702110352.html.
264. See Melody MacKenzie, The Ceded Lands Trust, HAWAI't STATE ASSOCIATION HAWAI'I
BAR JOURNAL, June 2000, at n. 11. See also Kit I Ka Pono: Stop Military Expansion, DMZ
Hawai'i/Aloha 'Aina, Sept. 6, 2004, http://www.dmzhawaii.org/dmz-legacy-site/kuikapono.pdf.
265. Correcting the Record: The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and Justice for Native
Hawaiians, Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Oct. 2007 (on file with author).
266. For example, several conservative members of Congress objected to the Akaka Bill-which
would provide a process of reorganization of the Native Hawaiian governing entity-as a simple racial
preference. See Richard Borreca, GOP Senator Skewers Akaka Bill, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, June
24, 2005, http://starbulletin.com/2005/06/24/news/story4.html; see Native Hawaiian Government
Reorganization Act of 2009, S. 708/H.R. 1711, 11 1
h Cong. (2009) [introduced in the Senate by
Senator Daniel Akaka on February 4, 2009].
267. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (holding that because the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs is an agency of the state, the election of its trustees must be open to all Hawai'i citizens). In its
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court not only misunderstood Hawaiian history, including colonization and
the illegal overthrow, it also downplayed its role in the ordeal, leading to the breakdown of the current
transformative relationship-psychological and political - with Native Hawaiians. See generally Gavin
Clarkson, Recent Developments: Not Because They're Brown, But Because of EA, Rice v. Cayetano,
528 U.S. 495 (2000), 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 921 (2001). By distorting Hawaiian history-
presenting a limited account without accepting the U.S.' responsibility for the events described-the
Court denied Hawaiians a measure of self-governance. Hom & Yamamoto, Collective Memory, supra
note 240, at 1774 (describing the Rice court's distortion of history to imply that the overthrow was in
fact "justified by Queen Lili'uokalani's undemocratic actions"). See also Arakaki v. Lingle, 477 F.3d
1048 (2007) (Plaintiffs brought suit claiming that state programs administered through the Department
of Hawaiian Home Lands, the Hawaiian Homes Commission and the Office of Hawaiian Affairs give
special treatment to Native Hawaiians in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses).
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"receptacle for reparations.
Conservatives in Hawai'i filed additional lawsuits to invalidate all
state reparatory Native Hawaiian programs, including the allocation of
Hawaiian homelands and the protection of Hawaiian culture.269 These suits
first denied America's history of colonization of Hawai'i and then
characterized indigenous Hawaiians as merely another racial group seeking
• , 270
special privileges. For instance, accepting the argument of an attorney
associated with a conservative national advocacy group, 27 a Ninth Circuit
panel rejected a private Hawaiian school's Hawaiian admissions policy as
"reverse discrimination.
268. HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-3(6); see also Day v. Apoliona, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Haw. 2006));
Eric K.Yamamoto and Chris lijima, The Colonizer's Story: The Supreme Court Violates Native
Hawaiian Sovereignty-Again, COLORLINES (Summer 2000), available at
http://www.colorlines.com/article.php?ID=75. Specifically, OHA is a special state agency created by a
1978 Hawai'i Constitutional amendment to address the historical harms to Native Hawaiians. See
generally D. Kapua'ala Sproat and Isaac H. Moriwake, Ke Kalo Pa'a a Waidhole: Use of the Public
Trust as a Tool for Environmental Advocacy 247, in Creative Common Law Strategies for Protecting
the Environment (eds. C. Rechtschaften & Denise Antolini 2008) (describing contests over water as a
cultural asset).
269. See, Arakaki v. Lingle, 314 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
270. See Eric K. Yamamoto and Catherine Corpuz Betts, Rice v. Cayetano: Disfiguring Civil
Rights to Deny Indigenous Human Rights for Native Hawaiians, in RACE AND LAW STORIES (Rachel
Moran and Devon Carbado eds. 2008) (describing attacks on Native Hawaiian programs as special
privileges).
The reparatory programs now legally challenged as seeking special privileges and ultimately
"reverse discrimination" involve education for Hawaiian children (Kamehameha Schools), Doe v.
Kamehameha Schools, 470 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006); Jim Dooley and Gordon Y.K. Pang, Kamehameha
Schools again being sued over admissions policy, HONOLULUADVERTISER.COM, Aug. 7, 2008,
http://www. honoluluadvertiser.com/apps/pbcs.dl/article?AID=/20080807/NEWSOI/808070356/1001
[hereinafter Dooley and Pang, Kamehameha Schools Again Being Sued]. See also Susan K. Serrano,
Eric K. Yamamoto, Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie, & David M. Forman, Restorative Justice for
Hawai'i's First People: Selected Amicus Curiae Briefs in Doe v. Kamehameha Schools, 14 ASIAN AM.
L.J. 205 (2005); the development and redistribution of Hawaiian homelands, Arakaki, 314 F.3d at 1091;
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, 67 Pub. L. 34, 42 Stat. 108 (1921), reprinted in I Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 191 (1993); and the protection and promotion of Hawaiian culture, Arakaki, 314 F.3d at 1091.
271. See Eric Grant, Oyez.org, available at http://www.oyez.org/advocates/g/e/ericgrant/. (Eric
Grant is an attorney for the Pacific Legal Foundation.) See also Pacific Legal Foundation available at
http://community.pacificlegal.org/Page.aspx?pid = 183.
272. See Dooley and Pang, Kamehameha Schools Again Being Sued, supra note 270.
Kamehameha Schools was established in 1887 by will of Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop.
Her will, which directed her trustees "to devote a portion of each years income (from the land trust) to
the support and education of orphans, and others in indigent circumstances, giving the preference to
Hawaiians of pure or part aboriginal blood." KeAli'i Pauahi Bishop (1831-1834): Will and Codicils,
Kamehameha Schools (last visited Apr. 29, 2008), available at http://www.ksbe.edu/pauahi/will.php.
In both 2002 and 2003, federal lawsuits attacking Kamehameha Schools' admissions policy-
specifically whether its provision giving preference to Native Hawaiians is a race-based exclusion
violating civil rights law-have been settled. In 2003, an anonymous plaintiff claimed that giving
preference to Hawaiian applicants violates a federal statute prohibiting racial discrimination in private
contracts, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the policy. See Doe v. Kamehameha,
416 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit later reversed and upheld the admissions policy in an
en banc decision in 2006. See Doe v. Kamehameha, 416 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2006); Dooley and Pang,
Kamehameha Schools Again Being Sued, supra note 270.
The plaintiffs' attorneys have since filed another lawsuit on behalf of four new anonymous
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The Bush Administration also opposed legislation creating a process
for limited self-determination for Hawaiians under supervision of the U.S.
Department of Interior.2" Despite passage of the Akaka Bill by the House,
Senate Republicans charging racial discrimination blocked a floor vote on
the bill.
27 4
Thus, sixteen years after the Apology Resolution and nine years after
the Joint Reconciliation Report, the Unites States' reparatory commitment
teeters on the brink of overall failure despite initial progress on recognition
and responsibility. The third and fourth R's of the Social Healing Through
Justice framework illuminate not only why, but also open a path for
framing future action.
Without reconstruction and reparation, there will be no compelling
sense of the kind of reparatory justice that fosters social healing-for
Native Hawaiians and for American society. There will be no
reconstruction of a meaningful form of Hawaiian governmental sovereignty
demanded by Native Hawaiian people, no satisfactory return of Hawaiian
lands,2 75 no clear protection of indigenous culture, no structure for
economic self-determination-all human rights reparatory mandates in
principle. Incomplete healing. A failing commitment to reconciliation.
Continuing divisions in Hawai'i's society.
The Hawai'i Supreme Court effectively acknowledged this very
proposition in the 2008 case OHA v. HCDCH.27 6  In its extraordinary
ruling, the high court cited the state's stalled commitment to reconciliation
with Native Hawaiians as the reason for imposing a freeze on the state's
sale of former native lands now held in trust. 27' For the first time, a court
imposed major legal consequences onto a government's reconciliation
plaintiffs of non-Hawaiian descent who claim they qualified for admission, aside from their ancestry.
See Craig Gima, Kamehameha Schools: Preference Policy Facing New Challenge: 4 Challenge Racial
Preference, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Aug. 7, 2008, available at http://archives.starbulletin.com/
2008/08/07/news/storyo I.html.
273. See supra note 267 and accompanying text. (The former Clinton Administration supported
the Bill.)
274. See Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act of 2009, S. 708/H.R. 1711, 111 th
Cong. (2009)
275. See VAN DYKE, supra note 228.
276. See OHA, 177 P.3d at 902. The Hawai'i Supreme Court ordered the governor to stop selling
formerly native lands (now held in trust by the state in part for the benefit of Native Hawaiians) until
indigenous Hawaiian reparations claims related to the lands are resolved through negotiation as part of
the state's legislative commitment to reconciliation.
277. See id. On April 29, 2008, the State Attorney General filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the U.S. Supreme Court asking for reversal. See State Asks U.S. Supreme Court to Overturn Decision
Restricting Sale of Ceded Lands, HAWAII REPORTER, Apr. 29, 2008, available at
http://www.hawaiireporter.com/story.aspx?32e7a8 1c-4885-437a-98ea-6ecbfl 000386. The petition
questioned the Hawai'i Court's interpretation of the Apology Resolution as law, contending that
"nothing in the Apology Resolution explicitly or implicitly impairs Hawai'i's sovereign right to control
or alienate any of the lands it owns." Id. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition on October 1,
2008 and reversed the state court's ruling on March 1, 2009. See Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs,
129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009).
2009]
ASIAN AMERICAN LA WJOURNAL
commitment. The state cannot intone "reconciliation" to garner good
graces and then abandon reparatory action when politically convenient.
The state's unfulfilled reconciliation commitment curtails the state's power
to do what it otherwise could legally do-sell lands it owns-until the
government discharges its obligation to resolve reparation claims to those
lands linked to the "illegal overthrow., 278  The language of reconciliation
provides the conceptual and legal framework, while the messy yet essential
grassroots political work at the ground level remains.
As the OHA Chair Haunani Apoliona recently observed,
For too long, our ancestors ... have waited for the United States [and
state of Hawaii] ... to make right the wrong that was committed in 1893,
only to see the small steps taken for our benefit persistently attacked...
Reconciliation has been an option thus far denied.
But with the challenges abroad to the United States' legitimacy as a
280democracy committed to civil and human rights, the United States has
greater incentive to take Native Hawaiian reconciliation seriously. And the
political winds of reparatory justice may be shifting with President Obama
in office. As president-elect, Obama expressed deep concern about
America's loss of international stature.21 He also embraced the language
of healing and bridge-building.282
278. The political resolution envisioned by the Hawai'i Supreme Court would involve the state and
representatives of a semi-sovereign entity of the Hawaiian people. See OHA, 177 P.3d at 892 n.7, 920,
923.
279. Written Testimony: Hearing on S. 147, The Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 11 (2005) (testimony of Chairperson Haunani
Apoliona, Board of Trustees, Office of Hawaiian Affairs.
280. See supra Section l.E.
281. See Renewing American Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, ObamaBiden, available at
http://www.barackobama.com/issues/foreign.policy/index-campaign.php#diplomacy ("The United
States is trapped by the Bush-Cheney approach to diplomacy that refuses to talk to leaders we don't
like. Not talking doesn't make us look tough - it makes us look arrogant, it denies us opportunities to
make progress, and it makes it harder for America to rally international support for our leadership. [W]e
cannot make progress unless we can draw on strong international support.").
282. See transcript of Obama's speech, available at CNNPOLITICS.COM, Mar. 18, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/03/l 8/obama.transcript/index.html:
[l]f we simply retreat into our respective comers, we will never be able to come together and
solve challenges ... Working together we can move beyond some of our old racial wounds..
. . For the African-American community, th[e] path [of a more perfect union] means
embracing the burdens of our past without becoming victims of our past .... [,] binding our
particular grievances ... to the larger aspirations of all Americans .... [aind ... taking full
responsibility for own lives .... In the white community, the path to a more perfect union
means acknowledging that what ails the African-American community does not just exist in
the minds of black people; that the legacy of discrimination . . . are real and must be
addressed. Not just with words, but with deeds ......
Obama: Victory Speech, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, available at
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/president/speeches/obama-victory-speech.htmi. For example,
Obama focused on closing the divide created by partisan politics:
Let us remember that it was a man from this state who first carried the banner of the
Republican Party to the White House-a party founded on the values of self-reliance,
individual liberty and national unity. Those are values we all share, and while the Democratic
[Volume 16:5
REFRAMING REDRESS
Moreover, as a presidential candidate, Obama promised support for
reconstructing the United States-Native Hawaiian relationship to protect
Hawaiian reparatory programs and to create some form of indigenous
Hawaiian self-governance.2 " He observed that the "Akaka Bill" would
"empower Native Hawaiians to. .. address the longstanding issues
resulting from the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i.,2 84  Obama
recited the democratic values underlying his support: "As Americans, we
pride ourselves on safeguarding the practice and ideas of 'liberty, justice,
and freedom."' By passing the Akaka Bill, which Obama deemed
"important legislation," 285  "we can continue this great American
tradition[and]... fulfill this promise for Native Hawaiians., 8 6
Many uncertainties persist. What types of meaningful reconstruction
and comprehensive and sustained reparation will comprise the kind of
redress that genuinely heals Native Hawaiian communities, the state, and
the country? The answers will turn in part on how Hawaiians themselves
coalesce and on what political and economic climates yield domestically
and internationally. The answers will also be shaped by how redress is
framed. If justice is framed beyond simple payment of a debt, and if the
American political winds continue to blow anew and international
advocacy intensifies, then the aspiration for reconciliation, even though
problematic, remains. And Social Healing Through Justice offers a
language and approach for articulating, organizing around, and critiquing
2871the kind of transformative justice that heals.
Party has won a great victory tonight, we do so with a measure of humility and determination
to heal the divides that have held back our progress.
283. See Derrick DePledge, Democratic Convention Plans Native Hawaiian Recognition, THE
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Aug. 24, 2008, available at http://www.honoluluadvertiser.com/apps/
pbcs.dlI/article?AID=/20080824/NEWS05/808240367/1009/LOCALNEWSFRONT (discussing the
Democratic National Convention as the forum for Delegates to show support for self-determination for
Native Hawaiians consistent with the 1993 Apology).
284. Id. (quoting Barack Obama).
Whether the pending legislation would constitute meaningful self-governance or be a sell-out
by giving the federal govemment too much control is heatedly debated among Hawaiian groups. See
Obrey, supra note 232. The Bush Administration opposed the Akaka Bill as a simple racial preference.
See Hawaii Divided Against Itself Cannot Stand, HAWAI'J REPORTER, available at
http://www.hawaiireporter.com/story.aspx?title-Hawaii+Divided+against+ltself+Cannot+Stand;
Borreca, supra note 266. Others opposing the bill argue that it gives too much control to the
Department of the Interior and undermines Native Hawaiian self-determination. See B.J. Reyes,
Hawaiian Group Rallies at Palace Against Akaka Bill, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN (July 21, 2005),
available at http://starbulletin.com/2005/07/21/news/story2.html#jump. Supporters-including
Hawai'i Governor Linda Lingle, the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement, and the Alaska
Federation of Natives-back the bill to protect programs assisting Native Hawaiians including the
Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Hawaiian Homesteads, and the Kamehameha Schools). See also Professor
Mark. A. Levin, Presentation at the Center for Ainu and Indigenous Studies, Hokkaid6 University (July
14, 2007) (on file with author).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See generally David Barnard, Law, Narrative, and the Continuing Colonialist Oppression of
Native Hawaiians, 16 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1, 44 (2006).
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VI. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY ON DOMESTIC
REDRESS INITIATIVES:
THE REJUVENATED AINU-JAPAN SOCIAL HEALING EFFORTS
But what if proposed reparatory measures remain partial rather than
comprehensive? What if a government and its mainstream populace
express a desire to heal the wounds of the past but decline to recognize and
act upon the full range of continuing psychological and material harms?
How can redress advocates restart or accelerate the social healing process?
One response to these questions lies in how shifting geopolitical
forces sometimes realign a democratic country's otherwise reluctant
interest in redressing its civil and human rights abuses. A country's quest
for enhanced international stature can shape that country's evolving
responses to redress claims. The halting yet rejuvenated indigenous Ainu
and Japanese government redress initiative illuminates this dynamic, 88
revealing how shifting geopolitical concerns influence Social Healing
Through Justice. Applying the framework to the Ainu-Japan initiative
offers insight into the future volatility as well as salutary potential of
American reconciliation initiatives.
A. Legal Subordination and a Promise of Repair
1. Overview
Despite over a century of colonization-encompassing almost total
219
confiscation of Ainu land, culture destruction and harsh discrimination 8 -
the Japanese government persistently denied that the Ainu were harmed as
"indigenous people" with claims to human rights-that is, until 2008.
290
After twenty-five years of Ainu organizing and agitation with the support
291
of local leaders and international human rights scholars and advocates,
following a local Japanese court's acknowledgment of Ainu human
rights292 and the 2007 United Nation's Declaration on the Rights of
288. For the leading scholarship on Ainu issues, see Levin, Essential Commodities, supra note 23;
Teruki Tsunemono, Constitutional and Legal Status of the Ainu in Japan: A National Report (presented
at the XVlth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, Brisbane, Australia, July
2002) (on file with authors); Hasegawa, supra note 256.
289. See Rice, supra note 256, at 3-7, 1I.
290. On June 6, 2008, the Japanese Diet unanimously passed a resolution to recognize the Ainu as
an indigenous people. JAPAN, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH AND SIXTH COMBINED PERIODIC REPORT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
7 (2008), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human/racerep3.pdf.
291. See A Statement of Opinion Regarding the Partial Revision of LL.O. Convention No. 107,
available at http://cwis.org/fwdp/Eurasia/ainu.txt.
292. Kayano v. Hokkaid6 Expropriation Committee 1598 Hanrei Jiho 33, 938 Hanrei Times 75
(Sapporo Dist. Ct., Mar. 27, 1997) (Japan), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 394, 423-4 (Mark A. Levin trans.,
1999) [hereinafter Nibutani Dam Decision]. When the Hokkaid6 Development Agency publicized its
plan to build a major dam on the Saru River in Nibutani, one of the few remaining ancestral Ainu
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Indigenous Peoples,293 the Japanese government formally recognized the
Ainu as indigenous people in 2008.294
The Japanese government for the first time is contemplating sustained
steps toward repairing some of the generations-long damage to the Ainu
people.295  Yet many Ainu and others are wary 96-past initiatives have
been piecemeal at best, and the national government still appears to reject
human rights reparatory remedies. 297  Indeed, many Ainu express a
continuing need for Japan to fully acknowledge responsibility for the
lasting harms of 100 years of colonization. Further, the Ainu are
demanding a far wider and deeper program of reparations, including return
of lands, economic self-sufficiency and partial restoration of self-298
governance. They worry that Japan's recent pronouncement is less about
Ainu justice and more about restoring Japan's damaged international
stature.299
villages, two Ainu refused to surrender their land. See id. at 399. The Hokkaid6 Land Expropriation
Committee decided that the Hokkaid6 Development Agency could sequester the land under the Eminent
Domain Law. See id. at 400-01. The Ainu advocates sued. In 1997, the District Court found that the
Committee's decision to take Ainu land was illegal. See id. at 427. More significantly, the local court
declared that the Ainu are the indigenous people of Hokkaid6. See id. at 420. The court noted that
Ainu people have the right as indigenous people to the pursuit of happiness and the right to enjoy their
culture as guaranteed by Article 13 of the Constitution of Japan and Article 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See id. at 417-19. The Nibutani Dam decision destroyed old
Japanese narratives of a "homogenous Japan." See Levin, Essential Commodities, supra note 23, at
501. See generally Horn & Yamamoto, Collective Memory, supra note 240 (viewing historical
perspectives as narratives).
The ultimate legal outcome, however, "rendered the legal content of Article 27 and the
constitutional protections as mere rhetoric." Georgina Stevens, More Than Paper: Protecting Ainu
Culture and Influencing Japanese Dam Development, CULTURAL SURVIVAL QUARTERLY (Dec. 15,
2004), available at http://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/more-than-paper-
protecting-ainu-culture-and-influencing-japanese-dam-dev. The court chose not to stop dam
construction because "public interest" mandated its completion. See Nibutani Dam decision. For an in-
depth critique of the decision in context, see the seminal article by Professor Mark Levin, Essential
Commodities, supra note 23, at 455-66.
293. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 136. Japan was one of 143
member states that voted in favor of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples in 2007. See United Nations Press Releases and Meetings Coverage, General Assembly Adopts
Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/
ga10612.doc.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
294. See infra Section VI.B.
295. See infra SectionVI.A.
296. See Tsunemono, supra note 288.
297. See infra Section VI.
298. See Interview with Kenichi Ochiai, University of Hokkaido School of Law, at Honolulu,
Haw. (Sept. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with Kenichi Ochiai] (explaining that the young
generation of Ainu are seeking land and political reform and not just monetary reparations).
299. See Leon Hollerman, Japan's Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat: A Matter of
Pride or Justice?, PACIFIC AFFAIRS (2002).
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2. History
The Ainu people have been harmed in the systemic ways that
indigenous peoples throughout the world, like Native Hawaiians, have been
damaged by former colonial powers. 00  Colonization devastated their
indigenous culture and language, exploited natural resources, appropriated
land, undermined self-governance and inflicted lasting psychological
harms.30 ' Colonization also damaged modem Japanese society as
evidenced by how the nation now professes a commitment to human rights.
Japan's Justice Ministry publicly reaffirmed this commitment as part of
Japan's current push to acquire a permanent seat on the United Nations
Security Council. 30 2 Yet, taking indigenous Ainu homelands, suppressing
Ainu culture and destroying economic and political self-governance are
stark human rights violations."
Systemic racial discrimination is also a human rights violation,' °4 as is
a government's failure to remedy serious human rights harms.305  Even
though courts almost never enforce a country's human rights obligations, as
mentioned earlier, highly-publicized unredressed human rights abuses
damage a country's stature as a democracy in the eyes of international
• -306
communities.
300. ALBERT MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED (1965). The Ainu were rooted to the
lands of northern Japan before recorded time. See Rice, Ainu Submergence and Emergence, supra note
256, at 4. A distinct people with their own religion, language, culture, and law inherently and
harmoniously connected to nature, they depended on their environment. See Tsunemono, supra note
288. Like many indigenous groups, Ainu livelihood consisted of hunting, fishing, and gathering. See id.
For centuries, the Ainu and Japan's dominant Wajin engaged in prosperous trade and occasional
warfare. See id. But these societal practices played out on a field of perceived inequality.
301. See MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED, supra note 300. In 1868, the long-term
Japanese colonization project commenced. Foreigners arrived to establish agriculture and industry in
the area. See Rice, Ainu Submergence and Emergence, supra note 256, at 5. The Hokkaid6
Colonization Office consulted with American advisors from the Bureau of Indian affairs to draft
administrative policy and encouraged Wajin to settle Hokkaid6 and forced the Ainu to infertile or
marshy land. See id. at 4-5.
Changes to the landscape forced change upon the people. Ainu men were "advised" to shave
their bears and tie back their hair. See id. Women were banned from applying traditional blue facial
tattoos. See id. Laws limited Ainu rights to natural resources-including their ceremonial annual catch
of salmon-and the Japanese exploitation of resources led to starvation in many villages. See id. The
Ainu battled disease, debt, violence, and poverty. See id. Traditional knowledge, language, cultural
practices broke down, and suicide became a common fate. See SIDDLE, RACE, RESISTANCE AND THE
AINU, supra note 23, at 67. The Ainu's way of life as they once knew it nearly vanished within a
couple of generations. See id. at 59.
302. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan's Security Council Seat Less Likely, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Apr.
24, 2005, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htmVnationworld/2002450215_japan24.html
(discussing "Japan's long-standing dream of a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council").
303. See generally Anaya, supra note 198.
304. United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, A/RES/2106(XX), Jan. 4, 1969, http://daccessdds.un.orgldocIRESOLUTION/GEN/
NR0/218/69/IMG/NR021869.pdtOpenElement.
305. See id.
306. See Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, American Reparations Theory and Practice, supra note 12, at
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Following the controversial Nibutani Dam decision30 7 and Japan's
assent to the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 08 and with a supportive prime minister, Japan's Parliament
in 1997 repealed the oppressive 1899 Ainu Assimilation Act ("Hokkaid6
Former Aborigines Protection Act").30 9 The Parliament enacted the limited
Ainu Cultural Promotion Act.31 °
Yet, until very recently, there has been little sense of a genuine Ainu-
Japan redress and no satisfactory healing of the persisting wounds of
historic colonization. That is why some can say, "It is the modem Japanese
state that ... usurped our land, destroyed our culture, and deprived us of
our language under the euphemism of assimilation" 3' '-and the Ainu are
still seeking justice.
This is why another Ainu justice advocate would say:
The Ainu are Japan's dirty secret. They are referred to as "former
aborigines" a hidden shame that threatens to disrupt Japan's colonial
myth of cultural [and ethnic] uniformity. 312
Even though culture is important, "the Ainu Cultural Protection Law
failed to recognize land or resource rights, or indigenous representation
in central or local government .... [T]he Ainu are struggling for
recognition of fishing and forestry rights, and the creation of the 'Ainu
Independence Fund.'313 The Culture Protection law "only supports the
protection of Ainu cultural artifacts and language. . . [mostly by] non-
indigenous anthropologists and linguists."
31 4
By deliberately refusing to recognize the Ainu as an "indigenous
people" the 1997 Culture Promotion law strips the Ainu of indigenous
human rights to self-governance, economic development, cultural
perpetuation and to reclaim homelands.
31 5
63-64.
307. See supra note 292.
308. United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 304.
309. See Levin, Essential Commodities, supra note 23, at 437, 467-68.
310. See Ainu Bunka no Shinko narabini Ainu no DentEo-tEo ni Kan sum Chishiki no Fukyu
oyobi keihatsu ni kan suru Horitsu [Act for the Promotion of Ainu Culture & Dissemination of
Knowledge Regarding Ainu Tradition], Law No. 52 of 1997 (Japan), translated in I ASIAN-PAC. L. &
POL'Y J. II (Masako Yoshida Hitchingham trans., 2000), available at http://www.hawaii.edu/
aplpj/articles/APLPJ_01.1 hitchinghammasako.pdf [hereinafter Culture Promotion Law].
311. Toshiaki Sonohara, Toward a Genuine Redress of an Unjust Past: The Nibutani Dam Case,
MURDOCH UNIVERSITY ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF LAW, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1997), available at
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v4n2/sonoha42.html#t2 (quoting KAYANO SHIGERU, OUR
LAND WAS A FOREST: AN AINU MEMOIR 153 (1994)).
312. See Tyson Yunkaporta, The Ainu and Japanese Modernity: The Assimilation and Ethnocide
of Japan's Aborigines, ASIAN INDIGENOUS POLITICS, SUITE10I.COM (July 4, 2007), available at
http://asian-indigenous-peoples.suitel0l .com/article.cfm/theainuand japanese modemity.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. See id.
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The 2006 U.N. Special Reporter on Racism supported the critical
assertions of Ainu justice advocates. The Reporter found that today's Ainu
face continuing discrimination in employment, housing, and education
31 6
which drastically affect their daily lives as well as their long-term
prospects.317 The Reporter also indicated that this discrimination is an
extension of the long-standing colonialist characterization of the Ainu as
less civilized and less worthy' 18-they were called "incestuous people,
living in holes and nests, who 'drink blood,' have supernatural animal-like
physical powers" (the kind of typical characterization of indigenous people
that all colonial powers deployed to legitimate land conquest). 9
Yet, there is another compelling reason for critical sentiments.
Something more is at stake than inequality. International courts recognize
systemic racial discrimination as a human rights violation.320 Highly-
publicized unredressed human rights abuses damage a country's stature as
•.• 321
a democracy in the eyes of international communities. Japanese societyitself has been damaged because the nation professes its commitment to
316. In 2005, Doudou Diene, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on
Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, assessed
the situation of minorities and foreigners in Japan. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC],
Commission on Human Rights, Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and All Forms of
Discrimination: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Intolerance, Addendum, Mission to Japan U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.2 6 (Jan. 24, 2006) (prepared by Doudou Diene) [hereinafter Diene Report]. The
Diene report found "disparate levels of education, social welfare, health, employment, legal services
and discrimination" and described how prejudice has been sustained over years. Kanako Uzawa, The
Ainu of Japan. Political Situation and Rights Issues, ARCTIC NETWORK FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC, Apr. 2007, available at http://www.npolar.no/
ansipra/english/ltems/Japan- 1 .html.
317. Citing to the 1999 Hokkaid6 survey, the Diene report noted that just over twenty-eight
percent of people interviewed experienced or knew someone who had experienced discrimination. See
id. One Ainu scholar describes the two Ainu "strategies" publicized in the report:
One is that educating the general population about the Ainu is the key to tackling
discrimination; many Japanese, especially on the main island, do not know anything about the
Ainu. Second, it is crucial that the Ainu are recognized as an indigenous people. The Law for
the Promotion of the Ainu Culture and for the Dissemination and Advocacy for the Traditions
of the Ainu and the Ainu Culture of 1997, which only promotes Ainu culture, is not sufficient
in this respect.
Uzawa, supra note 316. Ainu experience discrimination most often at school, the workplace, and in
finding a marriage partner. See Tsunemono, supra note 288. Discrimination against Ainu children at
school potentially affects the entire family at home - sometimes "forcing" the family to move to
another region. See id. Although the persistence of the most virulent discrimination has subsided and
the younger generations have become proud of their heritage, Professor Mutsuo Nakamura of Hokkaid6
University observes that discrimination has compelled many Ainu to continue to hide their identity,
even from their own families. See Hasegawa, supra note 256, at 4. The census population of 24,000
Ainu in Japan includes only those who declare their Ainu ancestry, but a better estimate is 30,000 to
50,000. See Diene Report, supra note 316, at 5.
318. Id.
319. Levin, Essential Commodities, supra note 23, at 329 (citing SIDDLE, supra note 23, at 27).
320. United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, supra note 304.
321. See Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, American Reparations Theory and Practice, supra note 12.
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human rights. Japan's Justice Ministry publicly reaffirmed this
commitment as part of Japan's current push to acquire a permanent seat on
the United Nations Security Council. 322  What is at stake is Japan's
apparent failure to live up to its promise of redress.3 23 Like the United
States and State of Hawai'i's treatment of Native Hawaiians, this shortfall
reflects an incomplete or even failing effort at Social Healing Through
Justice. It also reveals an as yet unrealized and increasingly shaky
commitment to democracy through human rights. The Four R's of Social
Healing Through Justice help explore this over-arching failure to date and
its consequences, and they provide a way to chart a future strategic path.
B. A Reparatory Justice Critique
Until mid-2008, the Japanese government refused to recognize the
Ainu as an indigenous people. The 1997 Culture Promotion Law
deliberately omitted that acknowledgment-it aimed solely to respect Ainu
ethnicity.324 That omission of indigenous status erected a major obstacle to
social healing: it represented the denial of the Ainu's unique identity and
• - 325
their standing as a native people among world communities. That
omission meant that the Ainu, treated as an ethnic minority, could only
legally pursue claims of discrimination (unequal treatment) against the
government.3 26 The Ainu could not claim, as indigenous people, the denial
of a right to self-governance or reclaim lands and resources and to preserve
culture. This stands in contrast to the Native Hawaiians, whose indigeneity
was recognized by state and federal governments.12' The Ainu lacked
standing to claim restoration of some meaningful form of their ancestral
"iwore. 325  No recognition of indigenous status meant little
acknowledgment of what matters and little chance of genuine social
healing.
The government's refusals to recognize also reflected a denial of
responsibility for the full range of long-term harms to the Ainu. Japan's
1997 Culture Promotion law only committed to promoting certain aspects
of Ainu culture, unlike the United States' comprehensive Joint
Reconciliation report which committed the United States to healing the
multi-dimensional wounds of Native Hawaiians.129  Japan's 1997 law
encouraged a rebirth of Ainu language, fostered the search for former Ainu
322. See Hiroko Tabuchi, supra note 302.
323. See supra Introduction.
324. See Levin, Essential Commodities, supra note 23, at 467-68.
325. See Yunkaporta, supra note 312.
326. See supra note 164, 199.
327. See supra notes 201-206 (describing indigenous rights to land, welfare and self-governance).
328. See infra note 399 (describing the significance of the "iwore" to Ainu communities).
329. See Culture Promotion Law, supra note 310.
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communal lands, and helped locate and preserve Ainu artifacts.33 ° These
are all positive developments. But the 1997 law denied responsibility for
restoring formerly productive Ainu lands - originally taken to expand
Japan's territory and later to foster national economic growth - or for
placing similar lands into an Ainu trust.33' It also denied responsibility for
assuring access for traditional cultural practices (like forestry and salmon
fishing), for guaranteeing the Ainu a political voice in the national
government, and for assuring Ainu local control over culture and economic
332development.
Equally important, Japan avoided taking responsibility for
characterizing the Ainu as inferior and unworthy-cultural
characterizations that historically legitimated colonization.333 Collectively,
even with the 1974 Utari Welfare Measures Act 3 34 and recent payments to
some Ainu individuals whose land was taken (lands undervalued as of the
time of taking, not according to present value),335 they reflect Japan's
failure to accept responsibility for sustained, systemwide harms.
The failures of full recognition and responsibility explain, but do not
excuse, why there have been inadequate efforts to reconstruct the Japan-
Ainu political relationship. (The Ainu people are no longer concentrated in
336one area; the same is true for Native Hawaiians). And some, because of
discrimination, feel compelled to hide their Ainu ancestry - as was the case
for indigenous Hawaiians.337 However, an indigenous peoples' claims to
some form of self-governance (or at a minimum, representation in a
national government) are not dependent on all living in one locale-
330. Interview with Ken'ichi Ochiai, supra note 298.
331. See Culture Promotion Law, supra note 310.
332. See id.
333. By asserting these ostensible differences between groups, portraying one as valuable and the
other as less, and then generalizing this hierarchy to the entire "lesser" group, the colonizer
characterizes the colonized as the inferior "other" and thereby justifies its privilege over or violence
towards the colonized. In essence, race is used to legitimate an act of economic and political conquest.
See Albert Memmi, ATTEMPT AT A DEFINITION, IN DOMINATED MAN: NOTES TOWARD A PORTRAIT
186 (1968); MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED, supra note 300; Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the
Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237, 262 (1989) (applying Memmi's
framework to Native Americans); Amicus Brief of the Japanese American Citizens League of Hawai'i-
Honolulu Chapter, Centro Legal De La Raza, and the Equal Justice Society in Support of Defendants-
Appellees' Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Doe v. Kamehameha (No. 03-00316-ACK), at 8-9,
available at http://www.ksbe.edu/pdf/amicusejs.pdf. (applying Memmi's framework to Native
Hawaiians); Barnard, supra note 287, at 14-26.
334. Between 1974 and 2001, Hokkaid6 conducted Hokkaid6 Utari Welfare Measures "to improve
the Ainu people's social and economic situation" Promotion of Ainu Culture, Hokkaid6 Bureau,
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (2006), available at
http://www.mlit.go.jp/hkb/ainue.html. See Rice, supra note 256, at 6.
335. See id.
336. Interview with Ken'ichi Ochiai, supra note 298.
337. See Diene Report, supra note 316, at 5, 9.
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especially when ancestral lands were taken and people dispersed.338
In light of the history of Ainu disenfranchisement and economic
dispossession, Ainu advocates requested guaranteed Ainu national political
representation 339-but this was rejected. 340 The Ainu Independence Fund,
requested by Ainu people to provide a self-governed economic base -- also
rejected.341 In addition, recent calls for a national law explicitly prohibiting
racial discrimination against the Ainu and others as a means for
reconstructing group relationships in Japanese society 342  stalled
indefinitely.343 Nor has there been a full genuine official national apology.
The regional Hokkaid6 government has taken some positive steps in
response to Ainu organizing. Some original Ainu land names have been
restored.34  Ainu language is promoted, festivals held and high school
curriculum on the Ainu taught.345
Nevertheless, without national and local reconstruction of political
and economic relationships to respond to the systemic harms of
colonialism, there will not likely be the kind of justice that fosters social
healing. Without engagement at all levels of government and throughout
the community, reconstruction will likely be temporary or illusory-and
the pain, dislocation, and social division will persist. The reconstruction
dimension of social healing highlights these consequences of government
inaction (or incomplete action).
Reparations, as they overlap with reconstruction, are essential to
healing to ensure that the reconciliation process is more than empty
341political words. Japan's 1997 Cultural Promotion law promoted aspects
of Ainu culture to repair the damage of past cultural suppression.347 But,
unlike the continuing piecemeal Congressional efforts at reparation for
Native Hawaiians, this is where the reparatory efforts stopped. No
restoration of productive ancestral lands (either directly to individuals or
338. See generally Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 136.
339. See [Ainu Shinp6] (Translation of principal draft, as proposed by Ainu Association of
Hokkaid6 in May 1984, available in SIDDLE, supra note 23, at 196-200.
340. The Culture Promotion Law was enacted instead. See Levin, Essential Commodities, supra
note 23, at 467.
341. Yunkaporta, supra note 312.
342. See Ainu Shinp6, supra note 339.
343. Interview with Ken'ichi Ochiai, supra note 298.
344. Yugo Ono, Graduate Scholar in Environmental Earth Science at Hokkaid6 University,
Presentation at Native Hawaiian Rights, William S. Richardson School of Law, Honolulu, Hawai'i,
Recovering Ainu 's Rights in the Shiretoko World Natural Heritage Area through Indigenous Eco-
tourism (Mar. 5, 2008). After initial missteps, the local Japanese government participated in this project
by creating signs in important places listing both their Japanese and traditional Ainu names. Id.
345. See Levin, Essential Commodities, supra note 23, at 468.
346. See YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 203. See also Ana Filipa
Vrdoljak, Reparations for Cultural Loss, Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: International and
Comparative Law Perspectives in REPARATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVES 198 (F. Lenzerini ed., 2008).
347. See Culture Promotion Law, supra note 310.
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into a native trust) or fair compensation for takings.348 Little or no control349
over or benefit from formerly native resources.350
The Japanese government failed to create an Independence Fund to
support Ainu businesses and economic development, 5 ' provide direct
support for Ainu access to higher education, 152 or even offer direct
symbolic payments to Ainu families (every surviving Japanese American
wrongfully imprisoned by the U.S. during World War II received a
presidential apology and a $20,000 symbolic payment).353
The Four R's of Social Healing Through Justice thus offer a
framework for ascertaining why Japan's repair efforts through mid-2008
have been experienced as starkly incomplete and insufficient. The wounds
persist. Although individually important, the efforts do not form a
comprehensive, sustained, and systemwide program of repair for the lasting
damage of indigenous Ainu subordination. Similar to United States-Native
Hawaiian reconciliation efforts in the 1990s, what appeared to be a good
start in 1997 toward peaceable and productive Japan-Ainu relations ended
prematurely, or at least stalled, far short of generating the kind of resonance
of "justice done" that fosters social healing.
Yet, as discussed in the next section, human rights organizing and
lobbying from many geopolitical directions in the summer of 2008 pushed
the Ainu back into governmental consciousness and compelled Japan to
reverse course. Japan's parliament for the first time acknowledged the
Ainu as indigenous people and partially opened new doors to future social
healing.
354
In doing so, it raised new questions about Social Healing Through
Justice. Will Japan fully recognize Ainu human rights? Will Ainu lives
improve, spiritually and materially? More broadly, what will the Ainu-
Japan reparatory landscape look like at the turn of the second decade of the
millennium as Japan seeks to temper China's growing economic and
military power,355 to regularize relations with North and South Korea,356
348. Cf Ainu Shinp6, supra note 339.
349. Cf id.
350. Cf id.
351. Cf id.; see also Yunkaporta, supra note 312.
352. Cf Ainu Shinp6, supra note 339.
353. See Ainu Shinp6, supra note 339. See also Civil Liberties Act of 1988,50 U.S.C. § 1989 (1988).
354. See infra Section VI.
355. "As China speeds towards economic parity with the Japanese heavyweight, competition for
resources and markets is growing. Both wish to match their economic prowess with leading roles in
world diplomacy." China & Japan Rival Giants: Introduction, BBC NEWS, Mar. 8, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asia-pac/05/chinajapan/htmi/introduction.stm.
356. Since 1998, when South Korean President Kim Dae Jung visited Japan and proposed building
a new bilateral relationship, Japan and South Korea have sporadically pursued a joint goal of: 1)
promotion of investment; 2) promotion of trade; and 3) promotion of cultural exchange. As a result, the
two governments set up the 21' Century Japan-Korea Economic Relations Study Team. IPPEI
YAMAZAWA, TOWARD CLOSER JAPAN-KOREA ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY (2000),
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Lecture/Sympo/pdf/kankokusoron.pdf.
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and to solidify its international influence on the U.N. Security Council?35 7
Because the Ainu-Japan healing thus far has consisted of a delayed
recognition of Ainu indigeneity, limited acceptance of Japan's
responsibility for healing, and minimal attempts at reconstruction and
reparation, the Social Healing Through Justice framework points toward
incomplete and possibly failing redress. Yet, the framework also
underscores prospects for rejuvenation. It indicates that Japan's concern
for democratic legitimacy in the face of strong international criticism of its
unredressed human rights abuses may trigger important advances in
redress. That dynamic emerged into public view in mid-2008.358
C. Geopolitical Redress Dynamics:
Legitimacy as a Democracy Committed to Civil and Human Rights?
In 2008, geopolitical forces triggered what may become a major shift
in Ainu-Japan political relations. As Japan lobbied for a permanent seat on
the United Nations Security Council and an expanded military presence in
Asia, it faced heated criticism from neighboring countries and American
organizations about its dismal record of human rights abuses and its refusal
to address continuing harms.359 Amid this human rights clamor, and with
Japanese leaders' rhetoric of healing as backdrop,360 Ainu calls for justice
gained political traction. In May 2008, thousands of Ainu demonstrated in
Tokyo, demanding recognition of the Ainu as an indigenous people.36 '
Hideo Akibe, a leading Ainu rights campaigner and protest organizer, set
the political tone:
Japan can set a good example for the entire planet .... It has taken a long
time to get where we are. I mean Japan is a country that has not very
smart lawmakers who say it is a racially homogenous nation. But for us,
[being recognized as indigenous] is just the beginning. 362
357. See generally ALEXEI KRAI, JAPAN'S QUEST FOR A PERMANENT UN SECURITY COUNCIL
SEAT (1999), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event-summary
&event id=3793.
358. See infra Section V.C.
359. See infra Section VI (discussing Japan's incomplete reparatory efforts); Takehiko
Kambayashi, Hokkaido's Ethnic Tribe Gets Recognition, WASHINGTON TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/aug/08/hokkaidos-ethnic-tribe-gets-recognition/; Erik
Larson, Zachary Johnson and Monique Murphy, Emerging Indigenous Governance: Ainu Rights at the
Intersection of Global Norms and Domestic Institutions, 33 ALTERNATIVES 53, 72 (2008) (the
government "was taking an increasing interest in Ainu issues because 'they recognized the international
circumstances about indigenous people."').
360. See Excerpts from Japan PM's Apology, supra note 106 (then-Prime Minister Koizumi
invoked the language of reconciliation in reaction to claims of Japan's historical human rights abuses).
See generally Sheu, Clash ofAsia 's Titans, supra note 106.
361. Catherine Makino, Indigenous People: Japan Officially Recognises Ainu, INTER PRESS
SERVICE NEWS AGENCY, Jun. 11, 2008, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=42738 (last visited Oct. 7,
2009).
362. Masami Ito, Ainu Press Case for Official Recognition, JAPANTIMES, May 23, 2008, available
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Building on years of organizing against rejection, that protest
preceded by two months of the internationally-scrutinized 2008 Group of
Eight Summit 6-a convening of the world's eight economic powers in the
Ainu's former homeland of Hokkaid6.3 64 The 2008 Summit planned to
focus on not only economic planning but also issues integral to Ainu lands
and culture, including climate change and environmental sustainability. A
new generation of Ainu advocates and international groups stepped up
criticism of Japan's Ainu human rights record.
Then, in a startling apparent pre-emptive maneuver one month before
the Summit, Japan's parliament unanimously passed a resolution
recognizing the Ainu as an "indigenous people with a distinct language,
religion and culture. 366 In light of Japan's history of official statements
characterizing the Japanese as a homogenous people and denying Ainu
indigeneity,3 67 this recognition was met with both welcome and skepticism.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura officially embraced the
Resolution in the language of ethnic equality,368 indicating that the Japanese
"government would like to solemnly accept the historical fact that many
Ainu people were discriminated against and forced into poverty with the
advancement of modernization, despite being legally equal to [Japanese]
people. 369 Critics, however, asserted that Machimura's "studiously vague"
words37° failed to reflect any major change in the government's negative
position on Ainu human rights.37' Indeed, Machimura revealed that Japan
at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20080523a4.html.
363. The G8 Summit members are France, Germany, United States, Britain, Italy, Japan, Canada
and Russia. Generally, the Summit focuses primarily on economic concerns. Recently, the forum
expanded to include global warming and other environmental issues. See NewYorkTimes.Com, Group
of 8, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/g/group of eight.
364. See id.
365. Interview with Ken'ichi Ochiai, supra note 298.
366. Ainu minzoku wo senjyuuminzoku to surukoto wo motomeru ketsugi [Resolution to Recognize
the Ainu as an Indigenous People], H20.6.6, 169th Sess., available at http://www.ipsnews.net/
search.shtml (search performed for "indigenous people") (last visited Sept. 17, 2008). This was the
Diet's first resolution addressing the Ainu people.
367. In October 2005, Japan's foreign minister, Aso Taro, reiterated Nakasone's sentiments on
behalf of Japan, declaring Japan to be "one nation, one civilization, one language, one culture, and one
race. There is no other nation [with such characteristics]." Rice, supra note 256, at 10.
368. See Masami Ito, Diet Officially Declares Ainu Indigenous, JAPANTIMES, Jun. 7, 2008,
available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20080607al.html. Also, Takashi Sasagawa, senior
lawmaker of ruling Liberal Democratic Party said many people "had wrong ideas" about the Ainu and
that "[this] historic, courageous decision is significant in reversing those wrong ideas." Japan
Recognises Indigenous People, AFP, June. 6, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5j2cftd-
RCW2lp5xSBwAXSH2YYfGw.
369. Id
370. Norimitsu Onishi, Recognition for a People Who Faded as Japan Grew, NIBUTANI JOURNAL,
July 3, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.conI2008/07/03/world/asia/03ainu.html.
371. The government historically denied that the Ainu are an indigenous people. Recent Prime
Minister Nakasone referred to Japan as an ethnically "homogenous" nation. See Rice, supra note 256,
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rejected the approach to defining "indigenous people" adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly through the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.37  Others observed that Machimura, and the
Resolution itself, was silent on issues of primary Ainu concern, including
Ainu land claims 3 73 and a full government apology.3 74  Still others voiced
mixed sentiments.3 75  A leader of the Ainu Association of Hokkaid6
conveyed appreciation, but observed that "[the parliamentary resolution]
offers no legal protection, and carries no obligations for the state." '376
In July 2008, the Japanese government, to avoid the prospect of "all
words and no action," and to follow the Resolution's dictates, established
the "Advisory Panel of Eminent Persons on Policies for the Ainu People"
to formulate national and local government Ainu policies. Addressing a
primary Ainu concern, Machimura advised the Panel that the government
"would like to work for the establishment of a new comprehensive policy
toward the Ainu by referring to related articles of the U.N. Declaration [on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples]." '377 After conducting on-site studies in
Hokkaid6 and remaining Ainu communities,378 the panel planned to issue a
report to the Chief Cabinet Secretary in 2009. . 9
372. See e.g. Ito, Diet Officially Declares Ainu Indigenous, supra note 368.
373. See Makino, supra note 361. Although the Resolution referred to the U.N. Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Resolution did not mention the Declaration's treatment of land
claims or economic self-sufficiency. The Resolution recited:
The government would like to take this opportunity to promptly put the following policies
into motion:
1. Using the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples the government
will approve that the Ainu people are indigenous people of Northern Islands of Japan, largely
Hokkaido, and that they are a people that have their own language, religion, culture and
individuality.
2. Because the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has been
resolved, the government will use examples of associated rules and the advice of
knowledgeable parties to review the measures that have already been proposed for the Ainu
People and establish comprehensive new policies.
Resolution to Recognize the Ainu as an Indigenous People, supra note 366. According to Professor
Hideaki Uemura, an expert in indigenous peoples' rights, "[t]he resolution is weak in the sense of
recognizing historical facts," Ito, Diet Officially Declares Ainu Indigenous, supra note 368, and fails to
refer to Ainu land compensation claims or an official apology. See Resolution to Recognize the Ainu as
an Indigenous People, supra note 366.
374. An 80-year-old Ainu woman expressed: "I'm glad to learn the resolution [passed, but] I'd
also like the government to apologize and make way for the sake of the Ainu people." Kambayashi,
supra note 359. Also, the Indigenous Peoples Summit in Ainu Mosir 2008 declared that "[the Japanese
government] should issue an official apology to the Ainu people in clear language in a public forum."
Id.
375. See e.g. Onishi, Recognition for a People Who Faded as Japan Grew, supra note 370
(quoting Yasuko Yamamichi, who runs an Ainu language school, refer to the recognition as "empty").
376. A People, At Last, ECONOMIST, July 10, 2008, available at http://www.economist.com/
world/asia/displaystory.cfm?storyid= 11707607.
377. Masami Ito, Panel Begins Process To Rectify Ainu Woes, JAPANTIMES, Aug. 12, 2008,
available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn200808I2a4.html.
378. Associated Press, Panel to Propose Measures to Enable Ainu 'to Retain Honor', available at
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D92GOVQG I &show article= I (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
379. Ito, Panel Begins Process, supra note 377; Panel Urges Laws to Assist Ainu, Preserve
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380The Panel's eight members were indeed eminent persons. Its head
was Koji Sato, a Kyoto University constitutional law professor and member
381of the House of Representatives. Sato declared that the Panel would
emphasize understanding "accurately what the Ainu people truly wish
for" '382 and that "the most important starting point is to have the public
accurately understand the history and grasp the situation of the Ainu.
' 383
As a result of colonial Japan's suppression of Ainu culture and confiscation
of Ainu lands, the Japanese public knows little about Ainu or its history of
injustice. Narratives of a singular homogenous Wajin culture have
persisted. 84
Why, then, did the parliament's Resolution recognizing Ainu
indigeneity, with its potential and problems, suddenly emerge in the
summer of 2008? Why did the government appoint eminent lawyers,
educators, politicians and cultural specialists, all of whom were instructed
Culture, JAPANTIMES, July 30, 2009, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20090730a4.html.
380. Among the other Panel members, Tadashi Kato, executive director of the Hokkaid6 Utari
Kybkai (Ainu Association of Hokkaidb) that drafted the Ainu Shinp6 25 years earlier, is the only Ainu.
He views the Resolution as a big "first step." See Onishi, Recognition for a People Who Faded as
Japan Grew, supra note 370. Hokkaid6 governor Harumi Takahashi will likely bear responsibility for
implementing any forthcoming government recommendations. See The Foreign Correspondents' Club
of Japan, http://www.e-fccj.com/node/2841 (last visited Oct. 7, 2009). Professor Teruki Tsunemoto,
director of the newly-established Hokkaid6 University's Center for Ainu and Indigenous Studies, is a
highly-regarded constitutional law scholar. Id.
381. See The Judicial Reform Council, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2001/06/12
shihouseido e.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009). See also Official Webpage of Koji Sato,
http://www.satoukouji.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2009). Sato recently played a major role in the Japanese
judicial system reforms. Id.
382. Panel to Propose Measures, supra note 378.
383. Ito, Panel Begins Process to Rectify Ainu Woes, supra note 377. Specifically, during the
Meiji period, the Japanese colonized Hokkaid6 and the northern islands and tried to force the Ainu to
assimilate as "Japanese." The Ainu were forbidden to speak their own language, restricted in their
hunting and fishing, banned from wearing traditional earrings and facial tattooing, and eventually lost
much of their land. See Levin, Essential Commodities, supra note 23, at 435-38, 464; Onishi,
Recognition for a People Who Faded as Japan Grew, supra note 370; Ito, Diet Officially Declares Ainu
Indigenous, supra note 368.
As a result, many Ainu had to hide their ethnicity in order to avoid discrimination and grew
up ashamed of their background. See Kambayashi, supra note 359. Ainu family, social, and cultural
traditions were destroyed, and many Ainu fell into debt, alcoholism, and committed suicide. Japanese
and Americans who were aware of the Ainu often referred to the Ainu as a "dying" or "disappearing"
race. See Rice, supra note 256, at 5.
384. Interview with Ken'ichi Ochiai, supra note 298. See also Levin, Essential Commodities,
supra note 23, at 467 ("[The current Culture Promotion Law] rejected all aspects of the New Ainu Law
pertaining to issues such as self-determination, special representation, access to natural resources,
economic autonomy, and anti-discrimination, leaving only the thinnest crescent of cultural promotion
and dissemination of information about the Ainu to the Wajin Japanese.") (emphasis added).
The Panel's report reflected many of these concerns, asserting that the Japanese government
bore a "strong responsibility" for restoring Ainu culture and suggesting remedial legislation, such as
utilizing natural resources in a way that would facilitate traditional Ainu practices, expanding the scope
of government aid to the Ainu beyond Hokkaido, and establishing public parks to increase the Japanese
public's knowledge and appreciation of the Ainu. Panel Urges Laws to Assist Ainu, supra note 379.
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to employ the lens of the U.N. Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples
in crafting what may be effective reparatory initiatives for the Ainu? Was
their appointment a step toward genuine social healing? Or was it more a
government ploy to dampen the kind of human rights criticism that
occurred before the G8 Summit - criticism that might further damage
Japan's international stature at a time when Japan is endeavoring to expand
its worldwide influence in the face of perceived threats to its economy and
security? Or was it a reflection of enlightened self-interest (an interest
convergence) - a sense that human rights norms, even if unenforceable in
courts of law, are transforming what societies are coming to view as right
and just and are beginning to shape international perceptions of what
constitutes a genuine democracy committed to human rights? Or a bit of
both?
Hideaki Uemura, an expert on indigenous peoples' rights, perceived
that Japan's quest for an influential international voice pushed
policymakers to dramatically alter their approach to the Ainu.383 Japan,
"which aspires to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council,
has already come to an international stage where they have to acknowledge
[the fact that they denied diversity and multiculturalism]. 386 According to
Panel Expert Professor Tsunemoto, the G8 Summit provided the needed
political leverage for Ainu advocates. 387 Other observers noted that "Japan
did not want any protests to detract from the high-profile gathering '388 and
that "the Ainu's lack of recognition could have proved embarrassing for
Japan's government. 389
Human rights pressure also appeared to influence Japan's actions.
The United Nations named 1995-2004 the "International Decade of the
World's Indigenous People ' 39 ' and adopted the Declaration of Rights of
Indigenous Peoples in 2007. The Declaration, which Japan supported with
reservations, established each country's obligation to accept responsibility
for the human rights harms it inflicted on indigenous peoples, and it did so
385. See Kambayashi, supra note 359, at 1. See also Larson, Johnson & Murphy, supra note 359,
at 72 (the government "was taking an increasing interest in Ainu issues because 'they recognized the
international circumstances about indigenous people."').
386. See Kambayashi, supra note 359, at 1.
387. Philippa Fogarty, Recognition At Last For Japan's Ainu, BBC NEwS, Jun. 6, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7437244.stm (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
388. Kambayashi, supra note 359, at 2.
389. See Onishi, Recognition for a People Who Faded as Japan Grew, supra note 370.
390. According to Japan's Asahi Shimbun's editorial, "[t]he Ainu have long demanded that the
government recognize their rights as an indigenous people. But it wasn't until the United Nations
adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples last September that this campaign started
to gain momentum." Associated Press, Japanese Editorial Excerpts,
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9384JRGI &show article= (Translated editorial excerpts
from the Japanese-language Asahi Shimbun's editorial published June 4) (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
391. Rice, supra note 256, at 8.
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within a framework of reparatory justice.392 Ainu advocates and supporting
international organizations decried Japan's hypocrisy in publicly
supporting the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples while
refusing to acknowledge Ainu indigeneity and commit to reparatory
action.3 93 The pressure mounted.
In reaction, Japan's parliament passed its 2008 Resolution recognizing
Ainu indigeneity and called into play reparatory remedies for injustice. Or
did it? Although citing the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, Japan's leaders disavowed its direct applicability to the Ainu.
Repeating Japan's reservation in signing the Declaration, they observed
that the Declaration embraces group rights while Japan's Constitution
protects only individual rights.394  In doing so, the political leaders raised
prospects of Japan by later claiming that the Ainu are not entitled to the
Declaration's self-determination remedies because the Ainu are not "that
kind of indigenous people." But this speculation may never materialize in
the Advisory Panel's anticipated comprehensive reparatory
recommendations that are to be guided by the Declaration.3 95
How do justice advocates and governments simultaneously guide and
assess the Ainu-Japan path forward? In concept and on the ground? These
questions return us to the significance of analytical tools for guiding and
critiquing redress initiatives.
D. A Strategic Path Toward Social Healing
The Social Healing Through Justice framework enables Ainu justice
advocates and supporters to strategically assert, and policymakers to grasp,
that despite intermittent progress, the attempt to repair the damage to the
Ainu people and to Japanese society itself to foster reconciliation, will
ultimately be judged unsatisfactory or even a failure unless the Japanese
392. See supra Section ilI.C.
393. See Jean M. Downey, Ainu Leader Tadashi Kato on the UN's 2007 Resolution on Indigenous
Rights, Oct. 15, 2007, KJELD, http://www.ikjeld.com/japannews/00000525.php (describing the Japanese
government's stance as a "slippery take which allows Japan to align with the high ground of the
Declaration, but also to skirt the issue of its own policies towards the Ainu people").
394. See id; Interview with Ken'ichi Ochiai, supra note 298.
395. Another factor contributing to the Resolution may have been the Japan-Russia dispute over
the four Kuril Islands - Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan and Habomai - known in Japan as the "Northern
Territories." Rice, supra note 256, at 10. Neither Japan nor Russia denies that the Ainu were the first
to live on the islands, but both governments claim the islands without reference to the Ainu. See
Fogarty, supra note 387.However, experts now believe that the Ainu may give Japan a strategic
advantage over Russia. Because "the Russian government has indicated a willingness to negotiate with
Ainu in returning the southern Kuriles to Ainu as the indigenous inhabitants of the islands," the
Japanese government "would gain leverage in bargaining with Russia for transfer of the islands if Ainu
are granted status as Japan's Indigenous People." Ann-Elise Lewallen, Indigenous at Last! Ainu
Grassroots Organizing and the Indigenous Peoples Summit in Ainu Mosir, THE ASIAN PACIFIC
JOURNAL: JAPANFOCuS, Vol. 48-6-08 (2008), available at http://www.japanfocus.org/-ann_elisele
wallen/2971
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government and people undertake significant additional reconstructive and
reparatory steps soon.
Equally important, the framework predicts that if Japan's Ainu social
healing efforts fail, and Japan's reconciliation/reparations initiatives
involving other groups or countries similarly stall or fail,396 then Japan will
have far greater difficulty on the global stage to claim full standing as a
democracy committed to human rights. It will not be able to fully assert
the moral authority needed to become a major player on matters of global
security and economic development.397
This assessment of Japan's flagging international moral stature as a
democracy committed to civil and human rights provides strategic insight
into Native Hawaiian and African American redress claims. America's
moral standing has been badly damaged worldwide not only by its falsely
justified pre-emptive war in Iraq and its human rights abuses in the Abu
Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay and secret prisons abroad, but also by its long-
standing unredressed civil and human rights violations.398 It cannot restore
its moral authority, the framework suggests, until it recognizes and
redresses the injustices.
Social Healing Through Justice also charts a potentially productive
future path for the newly-created Japanese Advisory Panel, government
policymakers, Ainu advocates and native peoples elsewhere. In short, the
Four R's suggest that if the Ainu people and Japan's governments and
people are to heal long-standing wounds of injustice-if Japan is to begin
to properly claim its commitment to human rights and democracy in the
eyes of international communities-then careful future attention is needed
to the demands of recognition (of Ainu as an indigenous people under the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and of the full range of
harms of colonization) and responsibility (for remedying those harms in
terms of land, culture, economics, and self-governance).
Just as important, successful reconstruction and reparation measures
require the Japanese government to take significant collective actions to
change the socioeconomic conditions of Ainu life and to repair the multi-
faceted harms both to the Ainu people and to Japanese society itself. This
may entail accelerating the collaborative search for ancestral Ainu iwore
396. Chinese-Japanese and Korean-Japanese reconciliation efforts concern the atrocities
committed during Japan's WWII occupation of Manchuria, the "Rape of Nanking," and the 200,000 sex
slaves known as "comfort women." See generally Onuma Yasuaki, Japanese War Guilt and Postwar
Responsibilities of Japan, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 600 (2002); Sheu, Clash of Asia's Titans, supra
note 106. See also Japanese PM Apologises Over War, BBC NEWS, Apr. 22, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4471495.stm.
397. See Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, American Reparations Theory and Practice, supra note 12,
at 52, 72.
398. See Yamamoto, Serrano, & Rodriguez, African American Reparations, supra note 7, at 1326-
27 (describing post-9/l I civil liberties abuses and falling American moral authority).
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(communal lands linked to Ainu culture and spirituality)3 99 in Birutani and
- • 400
Shiraoi and other places with substantial Ainu populations. It may entail
return of those ancestral communal lands as well as the restoration and
return of former Ainu forest lands (now uninhabited and owned by the
national government).4 'O Collective government, business, and private
citizen action may also need to create a substantial Ainu economic
development fund to foster Ainu self-development and self-reliance-as
called for in the Ainu Association of Hokkaid6's Ainu Shinp. 42 This is
the very kind of comprehensive, sustained reparatory justice envisioned
two and a half decades ago by the Ainu Association and now pushed by a
new young generation of Ainu advocates.4 3
399. Interview with Ken'ichi Ochiai, supra note 298. For the Ainu, the indigenous connection to
land is summed up with the concept of iwore - literally "backyard." Id. By returning the Ainu to the
land, in a sense, these specific provisions allow for economic self-sufficiency, a key to self-
determination and ultimately one form of reparation to formerly-colonized indigenous peoples. This is
significant, as "indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development are entitled
to just and fair redress." Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 136, art. 21.
One Ainu leader notes the desire of Ainu for their historical land, or backyard.
[W]e want land rights. About 120 years ago the Japanese government said that Hokkaid6 was
a national land and they took it, suddenly. The Ainu want the land to be given back- not all
the land, just where Ainu used to live. The Japanese government is scared that if they let
some people have their land then they will lose the whole of Hokkaid6. But we do not want
the whole of Hokkaid6. We only want those places which belonged to the Ainu.
Zohl de Ishtar, Japan's indigenous people claim their rights, GreenLeft Online, Mar. I1, 1998,
http://www.greenleft.org.au/1998/309/21807 (emphasis added).
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. The Ainu Association of Hokkaid--the oldest and largest organization representing the Ainu
in Japan-aimed to repair the damage of colonization. Operating as a "semi-autonomous sub-entity" of
the Hokkaid6 Prefectural Government, see Levin, Essential Commodities, supra note 23, at 444 n.87,
the Association petitioned that both the Hokkaid6 prefectural and the national governments repeal the
1899 Hokkaid6 Former Aborigines Protection Act. See Ainu Association of Hokkaid6, A Statement on
the Partial Revision of LL.O. Convention No. 107 (last visited Oct. 7, 2009), available at
ftp://ftp.halcyon.com/pub/FWDP/Eurasia/ainu.txt. The atrocity also promoted a multifaceted
movement to promote mainstream Japanese understanding of the necessity of reconstruction-the
establishment of new institutions to restore the rights of the Ainu as an indigenous people and enable
measures to eliminate racial discrimination and promote cultural education and economic self-
sufficiency. See Levin, Essential Commodities, supra note 23, at 442. The Association therefore
drafted the path-breaking Ainu self-determination law, the Ainu Shinpb. See Ainu Shinp6, supra note
339.
The Ainu Shinp6 constituted a comprehensive reparatory response to the harms of Japan's
northern colonization project. SIDDLE, supra note 23, at 181. Specifically, the legislation required: the
"elimination of discrimination against the Ainu people," Ainu Shinp6, supra note 339, at Section I;
implementation of"a policy to guarantee seats for Ainu representatives in the National Diet and local
assemblies," id. at Section 2; promotion of Ainu culture through education, see id. at Section 3;
encouragement of "economic independence of the Ainu" through agriculture, fishing, forestry,
manufacturing and commercial, and labor policies - in essence, return of land and resources, id. at
Section 4; establishment of "Self-Reliance Fund of the Ainu People," id. at Section 5; and creation of
consultative political bodies for Ainu policies, id. at Section 6. Each provision reflected an Ainu view
of reparatory justice. Collectively, they called for comprehensive, systemic change in Ainu life and in
the relationship of indigenous Ainu to Japan's governments and people.
403. Interview with Ken'ichi Ochiai, supra note 298.
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In the end, the Hokkaid6 government may have the greatest immediate
impact. Professor Ko Hasegawa aptly summarizes this. In addition to
recognizing the Ainu's collective rights to land and culture and to
autonomy, he says, the Japanese governments must "address the Ainu's
strained financial condition, guarantee their intellectual property rights on
traditional knowledge, set up a foundation to assist their livelihoods,
introduce scholarships toward the college education of Ainu youths, and
hire Ainu as local government employees." 4  This is the kind of
comprehensive, systemic and sustained reconstruction that promotes
psychological and spiritual health and at the same time targets social
structural transformation. It is the kind of repair that engages communities,
organizations, businesses and governments. And it fosters the material
change that generates the kind of resonance of "justice done" that fosters
social healing-for the Ainu people and for the governments and people of
Japan.
VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS:
REFRAMING REDRESS
While Japan and the indigenous Ainu embark on the next stage of this
now world-watched healing journey, indigenous Chamorus in the
American territory of Guam and aborigines in America's neighbor
Canada and ally Australia are invoking reparatory justice remedies rooted
in human rights. 6  In the United States, African Americans' stalled
reparations claims may get kick-started with President Obama in the White
House and an increased Democratic Party majority in Congress. 407 Indeed,
House Judiciary Chair John Conyers has been waiting since 1989 to hold
hearings on his bill for an African American slavery study commission• 401
(patterned after the Japanese American internment study commission).
The United States Congress recently passed legislation conferring benefits
to Filipino World War II veterans and is also considering Japanese Latin
404. Hasegawa, supra note 256, at 7.
405. See generally JULIAN AGUON, WHAT WE BURY AT NIGHT (2008) (describing indigenous
Chamorro self-determination claims).
406. See supra Section lI.B. See also Kristl K. Ishikane, Comment, Korean Sex Slaves'
Unfinished Journey for Justice: Reparations from the Japanese Government for the Institutionalized
Enslavement and Mass Military Rapes of Korean Women During World War 11, 29 U. HAW. L. REV.
123 (2006) (analyzing the Japanese government's failure to redress the horrific harms of sexual
enslavement of Korean women during World War I and the U.S. Congressional resolution urging
Japanese redress).
407. See generally BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO AND CON, supra note 8; Adjoa Artis, Truth
Matters: A Call for the American Bar Association to Acknowledge Its Past and Make Reparations to
African Descendants, 18 GEO. MASON Civ. RTS. L. J. 51 (2007); Ogletree, The Current Reparations
Debate, supra note 186.
408. See BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO AND CON, supra note 8, at 50, 143. Conyers bill, H.R. 40, is
reprinted in Appendix 3 of Brophy's book. Conyers has reintroduced H.R. 40 every Congress since
1989. See John Conyers Jr. for Congress, http://www.johnconyers.com/issues/reparations.
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American reparations claims.40 9 Native American land claims persist. And
Native Hawaiian redress claims against the United States and the State of
Hawai'i are enlivened by formal government commitments to
reconciliation. 4 '0  These reparatory justice claims are merging at a time
when the United States' stature as a democracy committed to human rights
is badly damaged and itself in need of repair.
These redress initiatives and many others worldwide have been
influenced in varying ways by the Civil Liberties Act of 1988. Indeed, as•411
Japanese American Redress commemorates its twentieth anniversary, the
Act continues to have far-reaching impact. 411 On an individual level,
redress for former Japanese American internees was cathartic for many.
This Article's Introduction recounts a former internee woman's emotional
reaction to redress. The crushing self-doubt had lifted. The apology and
reparations had "freed her soul." 413
Yet, in 1998, on the Act's tenth anniversary, Professor Yamamoto
asked, what would be "the long-term societal effects of reparations-the
social legacy of Japanese American redress beyond personal benefits?
' 4
,
4
It is clear that the redress movement provided political and legal insights
into the breakdown of democratic checks and balances during national
distress. But would societal attitudes change? Would institutions be
restructured? Would Japanese American reparations serve to catalyze the
redress for others?
41 5
It is now also clear that redress did indeed help open national and
international eyes to the social value of government redress-whether
termed reparations, reconciliation or social healing-and that it helped
galvanize new and old redress movements in established democracies, if
not by providing a model then by opening the horizon to what might be
possible.
16
In other important respects, the legacy of Japanese American Redress
and its place in Asian American Legal Theory is "unfinished business.
' 417
409. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009); See
also Filipino Veterans Equity Act of 2008, H.R. 6897, 110th Cong. (2008) (passed by House and
received in Senate Sept. 23, 2008); Saito, Justice Held Hostage, supra note 7 (revisiting reparations
claims against the U.S. by Japanese Latin Americans).
410. See supra Section IV.
411. See supra Introduction.
412. See generally WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH, supra note 9, at 240 (Japanese American redress
in the U.S. stimulating movements worldwide for reparations for historic injustice).
413. See supra Introduction.
414. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 7, at 478.
415. Id. Professor Yamamoto predicted that the legacy of redress would likely turn on how the
Japanese American community "engages across Asian ethnic lines" and embraces the efforts of many
others to repair the lasting harms of government injustice - in the United States and indeed throughout
the world. Yamamoto, Beyond Redress, supra note 7, at 134.
416. See supra Section ll.B.
417. Yamamoto, Beyond Redress, supra note 7, at 131, 134; Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra
note 7, at 478.
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Two views of redress collide. From one vantage point, redress for former
internees shows that wrongs against a racial group in the U.S. can be made
right. Indeed, redress in the form of an apology, symbolic payment, and a
public education fund generated a genuine measure of healing and also
enabled the United States to demonstrate a commitment to reparatory
justice."' From another perspective, political opportunism and conservative
backlash have cast shadows over even the most salutary present-day
redress efforts419 and, hence, over the meaning of Japanese American
Redress itself. Is it possible that Japanese American redress "may further
the general interests [of America] ... and the government structure that
supports it," while creating only an "illusion of progress"? 420 The post-9/1 1
government subversion of civil liberties under the broadly exaggerated
claim of national security, particularly the religious and racial scapegoating
421
of Arab Americans, lend some support for this view.
These colliding views signal the need for reassessing our
understandings of redress in light of domestic and international
experiences. What emerges is this: democracies deeply involved in widely
varying redress initiatives need an analytical framework for redress that
both guides and critiques contemporary social healing efforts. The Social
Healing Through Justice framework offered here 42 expands and recasts the
421
redress dimension of Asian American Legal Theory.. It coalesces
multidisciplinary insights into group and societal healing by drawing upon
American and global redress initiatives aimed at repairing the continuing
harms of historic injustice. It provides insights into the ways that evolving
human rights principles are remaking public understandings of the multiple
dimensions of reparatory justice for systemic harms-the psychological,
424economic, cultural, and institutional.
The Social Healing Through Justice critique of United States-Native
. . 425
Hawaiian and Japan-Ainu redress initiatives sheds broader light on
redress. First, it illuminates the failure of democratic governments' efforts
to repair the long-term systemic damage when those efforts focus mainly
on "compensation," without attention to the psychological, cultural, and
426institutional aspects of reparatory justice. Second, it reveals the salutary
potential of social healing initiatives as well as the emptiness of insincere
418. See Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 7, at 478.
419. See supra Sections II.A and li.B.
420. Yamamoto, Social Meanings of Redress, supra note 1, at 227, 229.
421. See generally Volpp, supra note 50; Akram & Johnson, supra note 50.
422. See supra Section IIf.
423. See generally DALTON, supra note 20 (describing how an emphasis on healing has entered
civil rights discourse); Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 8 (describing the significance of social
healing in international human rights landscape).
424. See supra Sections IV.C and IV.D.
425. See supra Sections IV and V.
426. Id.
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apologies and unfulfilled redress promises. 42' Finally, and most broadly,
the assessment of Native Hawaiian-United States reconciliation efforts and
Ainu-Japan relations provides strategic insight into how a country's
geopolitical interests and concerns about perceived legitimacy as a
democracy committed to human rights influence the country's future
actions on its commitment to social healing.428
The stakes are high. The time is ripe to rethink reparatory justice and
reframe redress.
427. Id.
428. Id.
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